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I. INTRODUCTION
When you are sick, you call your doctor. As the patient, you believe that your
doctor will examine you and make a decision on the best course of treatment for you.

2001-02]

THE SERPENT IN THE GARDEN OF EDEN

291

You trust that your medical interests are at the forefront of their mind. Simply
stated, this is the age old patient-doctor relationship.
However, modern health care systems have blurred this otherwise straightforward relationship.4 More money is spent on health care per person in the United
States than anywhere else in the world, and each year the costs grow higher.5
Americans spend greater than $1 trillion annually on medical care forcing the use of
cost containment programs in order to curb these costs.6 Thus came the birth of the
Health Management Organization (HMO). HMOs use financial incentives to prompt
physicians to recognize the cost consequences of their treatment decisions and thus
reduce the amount of care subject to insurance reimbursement.7 Financial incentives
place physicians in a tempting situation by encouraging them to order less treatment
and reap greater financial reward.8 Financial incentive programs have taken the
place of the “serpent of temptation” in a modern day medical Garden of Eden.9
The cutting of costs comes with a price to the patient. Sixty-one percent of
managed care patients surveyed stated they were very or somewhat worried that if
they became sick, their insurer would be more concerned about saving money than
about their medical care.10 In addition, many of the methods of cost-containment

4

RAND ROSENBLATT ET AL., LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 545 (1997)
(arguing that “[w]hat makes managed care such an important development is its effects on the
longstanding series of relationships within the health care system and its redistribution of
power among the health care players.”).
5

HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., MANAGED CARE: INTEGRATING THE DELIVERY AND FINANCING

OF HEALTH CARE, PART B 1 (1996).
6
See Daniel P. Sulmasy, et al., Physicians’ Ethical Beliefs About Cost-Control
Arrangements, ARCHIVES OF INTERNAL MED., Mar. 13, 2000, at 649.
7

Tracy E. Miller & William M. Sage, Disclosing Physician Financial Incentives, JAMA,
Apr. 21, 1999, at 1424.
8

David Orentlicher, Paying Physicians More to Do Less: Financial Incentives to Limit
Care, 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 155, 160 (1996) (“[p]hysicians recognize that they can increase
their compensation by reducing their use of ancillary services.”).
9

See Genesis 3:1-19 (reciting the biblical story of Adam and Eve and the serpent of
temptation: “[t]he snake tricked me into eating it.”).
10

See Miller, supra note 7, at 8 (discussing a Kaiser-Harvard study and explaining that
“[s]tructured information about incentives might correct public misperceptions arising from
negative media coverage, perhaps by presenting the issue in the context of other plan
attributes, such as quality improvement initiatives.”).
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commonly used are found to be ethically objectionable by physicians themselves.11
The Proverb stands true, “He who pays the piper calls the tune.”12
This Note will begin by examining the emergence of managed care starting with
the “fee-for-service” system and moving to the modern HMO. Section IIIA. of this
article explore several types of HMOs, compared with the different types of
physician reimbursement mechanisms utilized by HMOs. Physician reimbursement
programs often contain direct financial incentives. The main types of financial
incentives utilized by HMOs will be discussed. These incentive programs place the
physician in a dilemma when attempting to determine a patient’s best course of
treatment. In addition, Section IIIB. of the background addresses the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), focusing on the state action preemption
clause and the roadblock that ERISA creates for patients who want to bring claims
against their HMO.
The impact of physician incentive programs is at the heart of the recent Supreme
Court case Herdrich v. Pegram. In Herdrich, the patient, Cynthia Herdrich,
challenged the use of a common incentive structure that allowed physicians to profit
from decreased utilization of expensive medical procedures.13 Ms. Herdrich alleged
that the use of these incentive programs created a conflict of interest for her treating
physician and that conflict of interest caused a misdiagnosis of her appendicitis.14
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Ms. Herdrich but was later
overruled by the Supreme Court.15
This article suggests that Herdrich v. Pegram was wrongly decided. It will be
shown that the case should have been remanded to the District Court for further
review. In Section IVA., this article suggests that a fiduciary duty exists between the
HMO and it’s membership. Even under an ERISA standard a fiduciary duty could be
perceived.
In Section IVB., this article establishes that physician financial incentive
agreements implemented by an HMO can rise to the level of a breach of fiduciary
11

See Sulmasy, supra note 6, at 649 (concluding that “[m]any of the methods now
commonly used to influence medical decision making are considered ethically objectionable
by most midcareer physicians”). In 1991, the authors conducted a survey designed to elicit
opinions regarding the medical practice environment and to assess the career satisfaction of
physicians who had recently entered the practice. Id. at 650. The survey consisted of 102
closed-ended questions that were presented to physicians via telephone interviews. Id.
Telephone interviews were completed for 1549 physicians creating a response rate of 74
percent. Id. at 651.
12
David D. Griner, Paying the Piper: Third-Party Payor Liability for Medical Treatment
Decisions, 25 GA. L. REV. 861 (1991) (Proverb).
13

See Sarah A. Klein, Supreme Court to Weigh Physician Financial Incentives, AM. MED.
NEWS, Oct. 18, 1999, at 1 (discussing Herdrich at the appellate level and introducing the
question “[d]o common financial incentives such as withhold pools create a conflict of interest
for physicians and a cause of action for injured patients?”). The article further comments on
the appellate decision, stating “[o]ne of the concerns . . . about the appellate decision is that it
really takes what is pretty much a garden variety medical malpractice case and turns it into a
federal case under ERISA.” Id. at 2.
14

Id. at 1.

15

See Pegram at 213 (per curiam).
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duty. The article will show that the bonus distribution utilized by the HMO in
Herdrich could cause a breach by improperly influencing the physician decisionmaking process.
This Note will attempt to persuade the reader that the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in Herdrich v. Pegram was a missed opportunity. “[I]nstead of establishing
a clear rule about the legality of financial incentives paid to physicians, the justices
found a host of problems with the case itself. . . .”16 The unanimous Supreme Court
decision handed down June 12, 2000, established that neither physicians nor HMOs
can be sued under federal benefits law for using cost containment and physician
financial incentives to limit care.17 Herdrich was an opportunity for the Court to
fully explore the effect that incentive programs used by HMOs have on the patient
treatment decisions made by physicians.
In Section IVC., this Note concludes by suggesting that there are three solutions
that would assist in preventing a situation like the one in Herdrich from happening
again: (1) cases like Herdrich v. Pegram must be remanded for continued factfinding regarding the details of the financial motives involved, (2) ERISA must be
amended in order to acknowledge a fiduciary relationship between HMO members
and the HMO itself, and (3) physician financial arrangements must be disclosed to
HMO patient members.
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
On March 1, 1991, Cynthia Herdrich, was experiencing pain in the middle area
of her groin.18 Ms. Herdrich was examined by Carle Clinic Association (Carle)
physician, Dr. Lori Pegram.19 Six days later on March 7, upon examination of Ms.
Herdrich, Dr. Pegram discovered a six by eight centimeter inflamed mass in
Herdrich’s abdomen.20 Cynthia Herdrich was suffering from appendicitis.21 Dr.

16

Sarah A. Klein, High Court Hears Doctor Incentive Case, AM. MED. NEWS, Mar. 13,
2000, at 1. The article explains that at one point Justice Anthony Kennedy asked an attorney
for Dr. Pegram and the Plan “if there weren’t times when the physician, as an owner of an
HMO, was serving the function of plan fiduciary and a health care professional.” Id. Justice
Kennedy then directly asked the attorney “[i]s there some gray area where the doctor is
wearing two hats?” Id. The attorney replied that there may be some gray area but not in the
case before them. Id.
17

See Sarah A Klein, Justices Validate HMO Pay Incentives, AM. MED. NEWS, June 26,
2000, at 1(referring to the ERISA statute). When a state law cause of action is preempted by
ERISA, the claim cannot be pursued and must be dismissed and the plaintiff’s only remedy is
found in the remedy provisions of the ERISA statute. See discussion infra Part III.B.1
(discussing the effect of ERISA on managed care).
18

Herdrich at 365.

19

See Id. On examination, Dr. Pegram acknowledged that Ms. Herdrich was experiencing
pain in the midline area of her groin. See Id.
20

See Id.
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Pegram determined that an ultrasound should be performed in order to take a closer
look at the mass.22 An ultrasound procedure would be needed in order to determine
the nature, size, and exact location of the mass.23 Ideally, Herdrich should have had
the ultrasound administered promptly after the inflamed mass was discovered so her
condition could be diagnosed and treated before becoming more serious.24 However,
Ms. Herdrich’s insurance provider, Carle, required that plan patients receive medical
care from Carle facilities in what they classify as non-emergent situations.25
Despite the noticeable inflammation of Ms. Herdrich’s abdomen during the
examination, Dr. Pegram did not order the ultrasound procedure to be promptly
conducted at a local hospital in Bloomington, Illinois.26 Dr. Pegram decided Ms.
Herdrich would have the ultrasound procedure performed at a hospital more than
fifty miles away in Urbana, Illinois.27 In addition, Ms. Herdrich would need to wait
eight days until the procedure could be performed at the second hospital.28 While
waiting to have the ultrasound procedure at the Carle facility, Herdrich’s appendix
ruptured, causing peritonitis, a life-threatening illness.29
Cynthia Herdrich had medical coverage through Carle.30 Carle functions as a
Health Maintenance Organization.31 Carle operates as a pre-paid health insurance
21

Herdrich at 683. Appendicitis is defined as an inflammation of the appendix usually
caused by an infection in the appendix. See MEDICINENET.COM MEDICAL DICTIONARY, at
http://www.medicinenet.com (defining “appendicitis”). Appendicitis often causes fever, loss
of appetite, and right lower quadrant abdominal pain. Id.
22

Pegram at 215.

23

Herdrich at 374. Ultrasound imaging (ultrasonography) allows physicians to get an
inside view of soft tissues and body cavities without the use of invasive techniques. See,
MEDICINENET.COM MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 21 (defining “ultrasound”).
24

Herdrich at 374. “Doctor Hyman Lans, Herdrich’s medical expert, stated at his
deposition that Herdrich’s condition worsened during the eight-day waiting period ‘[b]ecause
obviously there has been another week of that appendix becoming necrotic and sitting in the
pus, and obviously the process has continued during that week and doesn’t correct itself.’” Id.
at 375.
25
Id. at 374. See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.b. (discussing how HMOs control costs
through the use of panel selection in which the HMO in many cases requires its members to
use only certain physicians or facilities).
26

See Herdrich at 365.

27

Id.

28

See Pegram at 215.

29

See Herdrich at 374. Peritonitis is defined as an inflammation of the tissue layer of cells
lining the inner wall of the abdomen and pelvis that can result from infection, injury and
bleeding, or diseases. See MEDICINENET.COM MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 21 (defining
peritonitis). In addition, the Appellate Court points out that despite Carle’s attempt to save
health care costs “[H]erdrich suffered a life-threatening illness (peritonitis), which necessitated
a longer hospital stay and more serious surgery at a greater cost to her and the Plan.” And See
Herdrich at 374.
30
See Pegram at 215. Petitioners Carle Clinic association, P.C., Health Alliance Medical
Plans, Inc., and Carle Health Insurance Management Co., Inc. [collectively referred to as
Carle] function as an HMO. See id. at 214.
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plan which provides both medical and hospital services to its members.32 Prepaid
medical services are provided to patients whose employers contract with Carle to
provide medical coverage.33 Ms. Herdrich was covered under Carle through her
husband’s employer, State Farm Insurance.34 State Farm Insurance provided Carle’s
health insurance plan as a fringe benefit.35
Carle’s owners are physicians.36 Dr. Pegram was a Carle physician.37 Like other
HMO systems, Carle collects its payment in advance of the medical care actually
being provided.38 Thus, the less medical care that is provided by Carle, the more
profit that Carle’s physicians, who are the HMO’s owners, have left at the end of the
period.39
Like any business, Carle looks to hold down its costs.40 Carle accomplishes this
through devices called “managed care.”41 Carle members must receive their medical
care from Carle’s own physicians, if at all possible.42 Ms. Herdrich contended that
this rule was the cause of the eight-day delay for her ultrasound examination, which
resulted in her ruptured appendix.43

31
See id. See also discussion infra Part III.A.1 (discussing the historical background and
function of HMOs).
32

Herdrich at 365.

33

Pegram at 215.

34

Id.

35

Herdrich at 365. Mr. Herdrich’s health insurance was through his employer, State Farm.
Id. ERISA is applicable to most employer-sponsored health plans and does not apply to selfemployed persons or to persons whose health care insurance is not provided by their
employer. See discussion infra Part III.B (discussing ERISA). “[B]ecause her husband’s
employer . . . provided Carle’s plan as a fringe benefit . . . (making it a “welfare benefit plan”
under ERISA).” And See Herdrich at 683.
36
Pegram at 215 (explaining that Carle’s “[o]wners are physicians providing prepaid
medical services to participants whose employers contract with Carle to provide such
coverage.”).
37

See id.

38

See Herdrich, 170 F.3d at 683.
systems).

See, discussion infra Part III.A.1 (defining HMO

39
Id. See also discussion infra Part III.A.3 (describing HMO cost containment
techniques).
40

Pegram at 219 (explaining that “[a]t the least, HMOs, like traditional insurers, will in
some fashion make coverage determinations, scrutinizing requested services against the
contractual provisions to make sure that a request for care falls within the scope of covered
circumstances, or that a given treatment falls within the scope of the care promised”).
41

Herdrich at 683.

42

See id. See also discussion infra Part A.III.3.b (discussing the cost containment
technique of panel selection).
43

Herdrich at 684.
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B. United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois
Herdrich filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of McLean County, Illinois, on
October 21, 1992, against Dr. Lori Pegram and Carle.44 The first two counts of the
complaint were based upon a theory of professional medical negligence, alleging that
Ms. Herdrich suffered a ruptured appendix and, in turn, contracted peritonitis due to
Dr. Pegram’s negligence in failing to provide her with timely and adequate medical
care.45 Herdrich was granted leave to amend her complaint, which she amended to
include two counts of state law fraud.46 Carle and Pegram responded by stating that
ERISA preempted the new counts and removed the case to federal court.47 ERISA
subjects employee benefit plans to federal regulation.48 ERISA preempts “any and
all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan” covered by ERISA.49
The District Court granted Carle’s and Pegram’s motions for summary judgment
as to the second fraud count.50 Summary judgment on this count was granted
because Ms. Herdrich relied on an ERISA provision as a basis of monetary relief, as
opposed to a basis for equitable relief, and the provision does not provide for extracontractual damages.51
However, the District Court did grant Herdrich leave to amend her complaint on
the remaining fraud count.52 The trial judge concluded ERISA preempted the fraud
count because Herdrich’s claim was for fraud under state law that involved an
employee benefit plan.53 The district court granted Herdrich the opportunity to
submit an amended complaint which clearly sets forth her basis for proceeding under
ERISA, including the applicable civil enforcement provision.54 Herdrich sought
relief under 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), which provides that:
44

Herdrich at 365.

45

Id. at 365-66.

46

Id. at 366.

47

Pegram at 215. When a state law cause of action is preempted by ERISA, the claim
cannot be pursued and must be dismissed and the plaintiff’s only remedy is found in the
remedy provisions of the ERISA statute. And see discussion infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the
effect of ERISA on managed care).
48

Shaw v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983) (“[t]he federal Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 . . . subjects to federal regulation plans providing
employees with fringe benefits”). In addition, Shaw stated that, “ERISA is a comprehensive
statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee
benefit plans.” Id.
49

Id. at 91.

50

Pegram at 216.

51

Herdrich at 366.

52

Pegram at 216. In Herdrich’s amended complaint, “[s]he averred that the defendant’s
breached their fiduciary duty to plan beneficiaries by depriving them of proper medical care
and retaining the savings resulting therefrom for themselves.” Herdrich at 366.
53

Id.

54

See id.
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Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses
to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan
any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through the use of
assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including
removal of such fiduciary.55
Herdrich amended her complaint by alleging that Carle rewarded its physician
owners for limiting medical care and that incentive entailed an “inherent or
anticipatory” breach of a fiduciary duty.56 Herdrich concentrated on a “year end
distribution” to the owners by arguing these “rewards” created an incentive to make
decisions in the physician’s self-interest, rather than in the exclusive interest of the
patient.57 The defendants, Carle and Pegram, then moved to dismiss Herdrich’s
amended complaint pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.58
By agreement, the case was assigned to a magistrate judge.59 The magistrate
judge recommended the amended state fraud count be dismissed because in his
opinion, “the plaintiff Herdrich failed to identify how any of the defendants is
involved as a fiduciary to the Plan.”60 However, the magistrate did recommend the
court give Herdrich one last opportunity to re-plead her claim under ERISA.61
Herdrich chose not to replead her claim and stood on the count as amended.62 The
District Court granted Carle’s motion to dismiss the claim, stating that Carle was not
involved in these events as a fiduciary.63
The remaining malpractice claims were tried to a jury.64 Herdrich prevailed on
both malpractice claims and received $35,000 in compensation for her injury.65
55

Pegram at 217.

56

Id.

57

Id. at 220.

58

Herdrich at 367.

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

Id.

62

Id. In response to the magistrate’s decision to allow her to replead her claim, Herdrich
filled a Rule 72 objection to the recommendation. See Herdrich, at 367. Less than two weeks
later, the District Court denied that objection and adopted the magistrate’s recommendation.
Id. The court gave Herdrich twenty-one days from the entry of the order to re-plead her claim,
which Herdrich chose not to do. See id.
63
Pegram at 217. The District Court accepted the Magistrate Judge’s determination that
Carle was not involved in these events as an ERISA fiduciary. Id.
64

Herdrich at 367.

65

Id. (stating that, “[t]he remaining counts, I and II, went to trial in early December 1996,
and the jury returned a verdict in Herdrich’s favor on both counts, awarding her $35,000 in
compensatory damages.”).
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C. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
Ms. Herdrich appealed the dismissal of the ERISA claim alleging a breach of
fiduciary duty.66 Herdrich alleged that she did state a cause of action for breach of a
fiduciary duty under ERISA.67 The Seventh Circuit found Carle was acting as a
fiduciary when its physicians made decisions regarding Herdrich’s care and that
these allegations were sufficient to state a claim.68 In order to properly state a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA, the plaintiffs complaint must allege facts
which set forth three factors: (1) that the defendants are plan fiduciaries; (2) that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties; and (3) that a cognizable loss resulted.69
The appellate court was of the opinion that Herdrich’s pleadings had sufficiently
alleged each of the elements.70
1. The Majority Opinion
The majority relied heavily on the fact that Congress, when it enacted ERISA,
intended the statutory definition of “fiduciary” to be broadly interpreted.71 In
addition, a fiduciary breaches its duty of care under ERISA whenever it acts to

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Id. at 373 (holding that “[i]ncentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as pleaded
here, the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exists (i.e.,
where physicians delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper
care to, plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses)”). However, the
Appellate Court also stated that “[o]ur decision does not stand for the proposition that the
existence of incentives automatically gives rise to a breach of fiduciary duty.” See Herdrich at
367.
69

Id. at 369. ERISA defines the term “fiduciary” as:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided in subparagraph (B), a person is a fiduciary with
respect to a plan to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or
discretionary control respecting management of such a plan or exercises any authority
or control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with respect to
any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do
so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the
administration of such plan.
29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1999).
70

Herdrich at 369.

71

Id. at 370.
A fiduciary need not be a person with direct access to the assets of the plan . . .
[c]onduct alone may in an appropriate circumstance impose fiduciary obligations. It is
the clear intention of the Committee that any person with a specific duty imposed on
him by this statute be deemed to be a fiduciary . . . .
Id. (quoting Chairman of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 120 CONG. REC.
3977, 3983 (Feb. 25, 1974) reprinted in, 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYMENT
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974, at 3293.) The Appellate Court also stated
“[c]onsistent with the expressed intent of Congress, this court has routinely construed the
ERISA term, ‘fiduciary,’ broadly.” Id.
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benefit its own interests.72 It was found that incentives can rise to the level of a
breach where the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no
longer exists.73 Fiduciary trust is broken where physicians delay in providing
necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper care to, plan beneficiaries
for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses.74 It was concluded that Herdrich
had successfully argued there was a flaw in the structure of the incentive program
established by Carle.75 This flaw comes from the authority of the physician owners
of Carle to simultaneously control the care of their patients and reap the profits
generated by the HMO through the use of limited tests and referrals.76 “Under the
terms of ERISA, Herdrich most certainty has raised the specter that the self-dealing
physician/owners in this appeal were not acting ‘solely in the interest of the
participants’ of the Plan.”77
In summary, the majority held the complaint was sufficient in alleging that
Carle’s incentive system depleted plan resources as to benefit physicians, possibly to
the detriment of their patients.78 The court held the ultimate determination of
whether fiduciary obligations were breached must be decided by the trial court and
thus remanded the case for further review.79
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissent relied on what has been termed the “market forces” argument.80 The
“market forces” argument assumes that companies sponsoring ERISA plans are

72

Id. at 371 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1106(b): “ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciaries from
‘deal[ing] with the assets of the plan in his own interest or for his own account,’ or
‘receiv[ing] any consideration for his own personal account from any party dealing with such
plan in connection with a transaction involving assets of the plan’”).
73

Herdrich at 373.

74

Id.

75

Id.

76
Id. Herdrich’s complaint set forth the intricacies of the defendant’s incentive structure
which included:
The Plan dictated the very same HMO administrators vested with the authority to
determine whether health care claims would be paid, and the type, nature, and duration
of care to be given, were those physicians who became eligible to receive year-end
bonuses as a result of cost-savings. Because the physician/administrators’ year-end
bonuses were based on the difference between total plan costs (i.e., the costs of
providing medical services) and revenues (i.e., payments by plan beneficiaries), an
incentive existed for them to limit treatment and, in turn, HMO costs so as to ensure
larger bonuses. Id.
77

Herdrich at 373.

78

Id. at 380 (concluding that “[o]n the surface, it does not appear to us that it was in the
interest of plan participants for the defendants to deplete the Plan’s funds by way of year-end
bonus payouts”).
79

Id. (“based on the record we have before us, we hold that the plaintiff has alleged
sufficiently a breach of the defendants’ fiduciary duty”).
80

Id. at 381 (Cir. J. Flaum, dissenting). See also id. at 380.
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customers who have chosen which group insurance polices they will use.81 These
employers would like to see their employees claims granted because they want their
employees to ultimately be satisfied with the fringe benefits offered by the
employer.82 These employers have the bargaining power to take their business
elsewhere if employee satisfaction with the plan is poor.83 In the long run, the
insurer plan would be harmed if employers left and damaged the plan’s chances of
acquiring new customers based on their reputation of denying claims.84 Thus,
market forces help to reduce the risk that the fiduciary’s potential conflict of interest
“will work to the detriment of the plan and the plan beneficiaries.”85
In addition, the dissent argued that since many plan sponsors and beneficiaries
view financial incentives as a desirable way of conserving the plan’s assets by
encouraging physicians to use resources more efficiently, merely alleging the
existence of incentives to limit care is not enough to create a claim of breach of
fiduciary duty.86 Because the complaint only asserted that the incentives used by
Carle were too high, Ms. Herdrich was, inviting the court to make a “determination
about the appropriate incentive levels in managed care.”87 No such standards for this
type of review exist and review of this nature would preempt legislative and
regulatory efforts in this area.88
The dissent did voice support of the full disclosure of financial incentives and
noted that it would find a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA if incentives were
not disclosed.89 However, there was no allegation of nondisclosure in the Herdrich
complaint.90 “The complaint . . . fails to make any allegations suggesting that the
81

Herdrich at 381.

82

Id. at 382.

83

Id. at 381-82.

84

Id. See also Chalmers v. Quaker Oats Co., 61 F.3d 1340, 1344 (7th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that “[i]t is . . . a poor business decision to make it a practice of resisting claims for
benefits. In the long run, such a practice would dampen loyalties of current employees while
hindering attempts to attract new talent”) (citation omitted). See also Mers v. Marriot Int’l
Group Accidental Death & Dismemberment Plan, 144 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir. 1988)
(stating that “[i]t is a poor business decisions to resist paying meritorious claims for benefits”).
85

Herdrich at 381.

86

Id. at 383 (“[T]he goal of a managed care plan is to deliver health care more costeffectively by eliminating unnecessary or ineffective treatments more efficiently. Some plans,
like the one addressed in this case, attempt to achieve these goals by introducing incentives
that encourage physicians to internalize part of the costs of treatment”). In addition, the
dissent argued that “the desirability of these cost-containment measures from a policy
standpoint is not our concern.” Id. at 382 n.1.
87

Id. at 383.

88

Id. (stating that “[t]he Majority’s decision provides little guidance for the district court
on remand, and I fear that the decision today could lead, both in this case and in the future, to
untethered judicial assessments of permissible incentive levels in health care plans.”).
89

Herdrich at 384 (“[i]n order for the market to function in this [market] context . . .
sponsors and beneficiaries need information about the financial incentives that are in place”).
90

Id.
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financial incentives to limit care are anything but the result of the bargain fairly
struck between the plan’s sponsor, administrator, and beneficiaries.”91 Carle
appealed the Seventh Circuit decision and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.92
D. United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court opinion reviews the background, both factually and legally,
regarding HMO organizations, medical benefit plans, fiduciary obligations, and the
meaning of Ms. Herdrich’s allegations.93
In an HMO system, “the physician’s financial interests lies in providing less care,
not more.”94 However, the Court argued the check on this influence lies in the
professional obligation that the physician must provide covered medical services
with a “reasonable degree of skill and judgment” in the patient’s best interests.95 The
inducement to ration care goes to the very heart of any HMO scheme.96 The Court
conceded that rationing care naturally raises some risks while reducing others, but
argued a legal principal attempting to draw a line between good and bad HMOs
would in effect be a judgment about socially acceptable medical risk.97 The Court
concluded this decision would need to be made based on data that the courts do not
have access to and therefore should be left to the legislative process.98
In the Herdrich situation, the Court argued there are two sorts of administrative
acts at play: eligibility decisions and treatment decisions.99 Both parties conceded
these decisions are often impossible to separate from each other.100 Dr. Pegram’s
91

Id.

92

Pegram at 218.

93

Id. “Whether Carle is a fiduciary when it acts through its physician owners as pleaded in
the ERISA count depends on some background of fact and law about HMO organizations,
medical benefit plans, fiduciary obligation, and the meaning of Herdrich’s allegations.”
94

Id. at 218.

95

Id.

96
Id. at 221 (arguing that “no HMO organization could survive without some incentive
connecting physician reward with treatment rationing”). The Court also stated that “[t]he
essence of an HMO is that salaries and profits are limited by the HMO’s fixed membership
fees.” Pegram at 221 See also Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 174 (arguing that when a fixed
budget is given to a physician, the “physicians will recognize that, every time they order a test
or provide a treatment, there will be fewer resources available for other patients who might
have a greater need for the resources”).
97

Pegram at 221.

98

Id. (indicating that “such complicated fact-finding and such a debatable social judgment
are not wisely required of courts unless for some reason resort cannot be had to the legislative
process, with its preferable forum for comprehensive investigations and judgments of social
value, such as optimum treatment levels and health care expenditure”).
99

Id. at 228. The court explains that “eligibility decisions turn on the plan’s coverage of a
particular condition or medical procedure for its treatment.” Id. On the other hand, “treatment
decisions are choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s condition (i.e.,
given a patient’s constellation of symptoms, what is the appropriate medical response?”). Id.
100

Pegram at 228.
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decision regarding Ms. Herdrich’s care was a mixed decision of this sort.101 Dr.
Pegram decided Ms. Herdrich’s condition did not warrant immediate action and the
consequence of that determination was that Carle would not cover the immediate
care, whereas it would have done so if Dr. Pegram had made the proper diagnosis
and the decision to treat Herdrich immediately.102 The Supreme Court reasoned that
Congress did not intend Carle to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes
mixed eligibility decisions acting through its physicians.103 The Court held mixed
eligibility decisions by an HMO only have a limited resemblance to the usual
business of traditional trustees in the classic fiduciary relationship.104
The Court also reviewed how the fiduciary standard, if applied, would affect
HMOs.105 Recovery on this type of claim would be warranted “simply upon a
showing that the profit incentive to ration care would generally affect mixed
[eligibility] decisions” and convert the HMO into a guarantor of recovery, opening
the floodgates to claims of this kind.106 The Court stated:
If Congress wishes to restrict its approval of HMO practice to certain
preferred forms, it may choose to do so . . . [b]ut the Federal Judiciary
would be acting contrary to the congressional policy of allowing HMO
organizations if it were to entertain an ERISA fiduciary claim portending
wholesale attacks on existing HMOs solely because of their structure,
untethered to claims of concrete harm.107
The Court believed every claim of fiduciary breach by an HMO physician
making mixed decisions would boil down to another malpractice claim.108 The only
advantage the Court found in allowing malpractice actions, as ERISA federal
fiduciary breach claims against HMOs, was that patients would be eligible for
reimbursement of attorney’s fees if they prevailed.109 Also, the Court feared the
physician could possibly be held liable for both a state and federal malpractice
claim.110

101

Id.

102

Id.

103

Id. at 231 (holding that “[b]ased on our understanding of the matters just discussed, we
think Congress did not intend Carle or any other HMO to be treated as a fiduciary to the extent
that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting through its physicians.”).
104
Id. at 232 (arguing that “[p]rivate trustees do not make treatment judgments, whereas
treatment judgments are what physicians reaching mixed decisions do make, by definition.”).
105

Pegram at 232.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 233-34.

108

Id. at 235.

109

Id. at 236 (“we can be fairly sure that Congress did not create fiduciary obligations out
of concern that state plaintiffs were not suing often enough, or were paying too much in legal
fees.”).
110
Pegram at 236 (arguing that “not only would an HMO be liable as a fiduciary in the
first instance for its own breach of fiduciary duty committed through the acts of its physician
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The Court, in a unanimous decision, reversed the Seventh Circuit decision
holding “mixed eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not fiduciary decisions
under ERISA” and thus Herdrich’s ERISA count failed to state a claim.111
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Health Management Organization
1. Historical Background and Function of HMOs
Traditional medical care in the United States has been provided on a “fee-forservice” basis in which the physician charges a certain amount for each procedure
performed (i.e. general physical exam, vaccination, tonsillectomy).112 Physicians
were faced with very few constraints and practiced more or less how they wanted.113
Insurance companies simply paid the bills submitted to them from the physicians
with little review.114 Most insurers even let the physicians determine both the rates
and terms of reimbursement.115 In this type of system, a physician’s financial
incentive is to provide more care, not less.116
In addition to the use of the “fee-for-service” system, non-economic factors have
caused the cost of health care to continually rise. Physicians have a desire to please
patients and to convince them that they are receiving high-quality health care, thus
they order more tests and procedures.117 Also, our medical care system functions in

employee, but the physician employee would also be subject to liability on the same basic
analysis that would charge the HMO.”).
111

Id. at 237.

112

Id. at 218 (explaining that “the physician bills the patient for services provided or, if
there is insurance and the doctor is willing, submits the bill for the patient’s care to the insurer,
for payment subject to the terms of the insurance.”).
113

ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 543 (citing Jonathan Weiner & Gregory de Lissovy,
Razing a Tower of Babel: A Taxonomy for Managed Care and Health Insurance Plans, 18 J.
HEALTH POL., POL’Y, & L. 75, 76-78 (1993) (explaining that “[i]nsurance companies usually
served as passive go-betweens: the intermediary between the employer and provider.”).
114

Id. (explaining that “[w]ith little scrutiny they paid bills submitted to them on a fee-forservice (FFS), retrospective basis.”).
115
Id. (further explaining “[l]ike other indemnity-orientated policies, underwriting losses
experiences by the carrier were ultimately passed to the purchaser in the form of increased
premiums.”).
116

HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., MANAGED CARE: INTEGRATING THE DELIVERY AND
FINANCING OF HEALTH CARE, PART A 3 (1996). “Physicians play a key role in determining
what medical resources are used.” Supra. “Once an individual decides to seek care,
physicians either strongly influence, or directly make, most of the decisions that determine the
cost of care.” Id. “Unfortunately, most physicians have had neither the knowledge or the
incentive to be concerned about cost.” Id.
117

Id. at 4.
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an environment of constantly changing technology, which may push a physician to
do more than just provide only necessary and effective care.118
The threat of malpractice suits against physicians also adds to the increased cost
of health care. The physician community’s fear of adverse malpractice judgements
caused physicians to practice “defensive medicine.”119 “Defensive medicine”
involves the utilization of unnecessary medical tests in order to limit the physician’s
potential liability for malpractice, but in the long run it caused skyrocketing health
care costs.120 These rising costs made managed care a necessity.121
Managed care has been around since the 1930s when the first prepaid medical
group practices were established.122 The group practices would become the
forerunners to modern HMOs.123 These group practices were established as a way to
improve access to quality health care and as a vehicle to provide basic medical
services.124 Since the 1930s, there has been an explosion of HMOs, largely due in
response to the ever-rising cost of healthcare.125 By 1995, more than 140 million
privately insured Americans, or seventy-eight percent, were members of some kind
of managed care plan.126
118
See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 3-4. In addition, new
technologies can use more resources then they replace. Id. at 5. Some new technologies are
beneficial in improving patient welfare, however, others contribute little to improved health
status. Id. “The proliferation of new technologies reflect Americans’ general tendency to
place excessive reliance on technology and medical intervention to manage health care
problems.” Id.
119
Corrine P. Parver & Kimberly Alyson Martinez, Holding Decision Makers Liable:
Assessing Liability Under A Managed Health Care System, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 199, 202
(1999).
120

Id. at 202. “In addition, the cost of litigating and settling those disputes that go to court
adds to malpractice premium costs, which are ultimately translated into higher provider fees.”
HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 6. Also, states that have not placed
limits on malpractice award for punitive damages contribute to the rising costs of health care.
Id.
121

See Parver, supra note 119, at 202.

122

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 2. Kaiser Foundation offered
its first health care plans in the 1930s. See, Parver, supra note 119, at 203.
123

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 2.

124

Id.

125
Id. at 2. In addition, a rapid expansion of HMOs occurred when Congress passed the
Health Maintenance Organization Act [hereinafter HMO Act] in 1973. See Parver, supra note
119, at 204. This legislation created industry growth by providing federal grants and loans to
HMOs qualifying under the act. Id. The HMO Act originally defined an HMO as “a public or
private entity that provides basis and supplemental health services to its enrollees, without
limiting the time or cost of those services.” HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5,
at 166. The statute was amended in 1988 to permit HMOs to provide at least ten percent of
their health services through out-of-network physicians and charge reasonable deductibles for
those out-of-network services. Id. at 167.
126

See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 544. Managed care not only affects privately insured
persons. Id. “By 1996 one-third of the nation’s nearly 36 million Medicaid beneficiaries were
enrolled in some form of managed care.” Id. In addition, nine percent of the Medicare
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There can be significant variations among the different types of modern
HMOs.127 However, four main characteristics are found in all HMO systems.128
First, HMOs establish arrangements with selected providers to furnish a
comprehensive set of health care services to enrollees.129 Second, HMOs create and
utilize explicit standards for the selection of their health care providers.130 Third, all
HMOs implement formal programs for ongoing quality assurance and utilization
review programs.131 Finally, most HMOs utilize financial incentives to enrollees to
encourage the use of providers and procedures covered by the HMO.132
“Experts in managed care note that there is no universally accepted managed care
terminology.”133 Despite its many forms, HMOs can be defined as:
Any health coverage arrangement in which, for a pre-set fee . . . a
company sells a defined package of benefits to a purchaser, with services
furnished to enrolled members through a network of participating
providers who operate under written contractual or employment
agreements, and whose selection and authority to furnish covered benefits
is controlled by the managed care company.134
Regardless of the type of HMO, all managed care plans combine traditional
notions of insurance with medical care itself, selling care from physicians who are
members of the HMO network to purchasers for a pre-negotiated fee.135 The HMO
assumes the financial risk of providing the benefits promised in the contract and
keeps the money paid regardless of the usage of health benefits by the participant.136
For example, if the participant becomes expensively ill, the HMO is responsible for
population, which is over three million beneficiaries, were members of Medicare managed
care plans. Id.
127

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 2.

128

Id.

129

Id. See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.b (discussing the cost-containment technique
of panel selection in which the HMO manages care by encouraging, and sometime requiring,
its members to use only certain facilities or physicians).
130

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., B, supra note 5, at 2.

131

Id. See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.a (discussing utilization review programs in
the HMO setting).
132

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., B, supra note 5, at 2. See also discussion infra Part
III.A.3.c (discussing HMO financial incentive programs).
133
ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 551 (quoting Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft,
Managed Care Plan Performance since 1980: A Literature Analysis, 271 JAMA 1512 (1994)
(quotations omitted).
134

Id. at 551-52. “What usually distinguishes the managed care plans from those that are
more traditional is that there is a party that takes responsibility for integrating and coordinating
the financing and delivery of services across what previously were fragmented provider and
payer entities.” Id. at 545 (quoting Weiner, supra note 113, at 77).
135

Id. at 552.

136

Pegram at 216.
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the treatment agreed upon even if its cost exceeds the participant’s premiums.137
Physicians are required to administer any “medically necessary care” that is required
under the contract.138 Unlike the “fee-for-service” program, physicians are given an
incentive not to provide unnecessary medical care.139 HMOs enable employers who
offer health care benefits and their employees an opportunity to save money.140 In
1999, approximately sixty million people in the United States were enrolled in HMO
programs.141
2. Types of HMOs
There are several models of HMOs.142 HMO models are defined by the
organizational structure of the participating physicians and the relationship between
the HMO and the contracting physicians or physician organizations.143 The three
main types of HMOs are: the staff model, the independent practice association model
(IPA), and the group model.144
a. The Staff Model
The staff model is comprised of physicians who are employed by and are paid a
salary by the HMO.145 “Frequently, the employed physicians provide services
exclusively to the enrollees of a specific plan.”146 Staff model arrangements provide
a high degree of control over both the cost and delivery of medical services.147
137

Id.

138

See Christine E. Brasel, Comment, Managed Care Liability: State Legislation May Arm
Angry Members Legal Ammo To Fire At Their MCOs For Cost Containment Tactics . . . But
Could It Backfire?, 27 CAP. U. L. REV. 449, 451 (1999). The definition of the term “medical
necessity” has been a topic of debate in the courts. See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 213
(citing Dallis v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 574 F. Supp 547, 550 (N.D. Ga. 1983)) (stating, “[n]o
insurance is afforded . . . as to charges . . . for care, treatment, services or supplies which are
not necessary for the treatment of the injury or illness concerned”)). See also Siegal v. Health
Care Serv. Corp., 401 N.E.2d 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (stating “where there is no ambiguity
that contract limits coverage to medically necessary services, ‘medically necessary’ is an issue
of fact to be decided by the jury.”).
139

See Brasel, supra note 138, at 451.

140

Id.

141

Id.

142

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 44.

143

Id.

144

Brasel, supra note 138, at 451. Not all HMOs fit neatly into one of the above listed
categories. Id. at 452. In addition there is a PPO in which physicians, hospitals, and other
health care providers join together to provide services to members who generally pay a
premium to the PPO which reimburses the health care providers for services rendered. Id.
145

Id. at 451.

146

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 44.

147

Id. (arguing that the Staff Model “may be desirable and/or necessary where the local
provider community is unwilling or has limited capacity to enter into HMO contracts or serve
the plan’s enrollment.”).
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Developing and operating health care facilities and employing health care
professions requires a significant amount of capital and capabilities beyond those of
most insurers.148 Thus, developing a staff model HMO is only appropriate in
situations in which there is an insufficient supply of independent physicians in the
community willing to participate in the HMO and the HMO has sufficient capital.149
b. The IPA Model
In contrast, the IPA model is composed of a group of physicians that contract
with an HMO to provide services to the HMO’s contract members.150 However, IPA
physicians also treat individuals who are not members of HMOs.151 The physicians
in an IPA model are paid a fee based on the services that are rendered or through
capitation.152 Capitation is a method by which physicians are paid a fixed amount
per patient and receive the same amount irrespective of the quantity of services that
are provided to the HMO contract member.153
The IPA model has at least one principal disadvantage. When the IPA model is
compared to the staff model, it is more difficult to control costs and affect the
practice patterns of independent physicians.154 Control is especially difficult when
only a small portion of the physician’s practice is under the HMO.155
However, IPAs are the fastest growing type of HMO.156 This growth can be
attributed to the limited liability assumed in the IPA setting.157 The HMOs liability
is most limited in this model due to the several layers of separation between the
HMO and the physician.158 “Control in terms of an agency relationship is more
difficult to establish here.”159 When a patient goes to the doctor’s office instead of
the HMO office, proving reliance on the doctor as an HMO employee rather than an
independent contractor is more troublesome.160

148

Id. at 45.

149

Id. Other important factors include: (a) the HMO has a high market penetration; (b)
there is access to sufficient capital; and, (c) there exists extensive familiarity with operating
health care facilities and managing health professionals. See id. at 45.
150
See, Brasel, supra note 138, at 451. IPA is the term used to describe the Independent
Practice Association Model. See Parver, supra note 119, at 204.
151
Id. at 452. IPA doctors work in their own offices, employ their own staffs and keep their
own records. See Parver, supra note 119, at 204.
152

See Brasel, supra note 138, at 452.

153

Id.

154

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 47.

155

Id.

156

See Parver, supra note 119, at 205.

157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id.

160

Id. at 205.
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c. The Group Model
Finally, the group model is generally described as a contract between an
employer and a medical group affiliated with the HMO to render medical services to
its employees.161 In the group model, fees are paid to the medical group on a
“capitation basis.”162 The HMO pays a physician group a negotiated, per capita rate,
which the medical group distributes among the individual physicians in a variety of
ways.163
The above described types of HMOs have different levels of legal liability.
Overall, the legal liability of an HMO for the health care that it manages for its
members depends on the amount and level of control exerted by the managed care
organization over physicians.164 The liability is the greatest in the staff model and
lower in the IPA and Group models.165 In IPA and Group models there are more
layers of separation between the physicians and the HMO thus the control exerted by
the HMO over the physician is lower.166 In the staff-model the HMO directly
employs the doctors which sets up an employer-employee relationship. Thus, the
legal liability of the HMO is lighter in this model.167
3. Controlling Costs and Cost Containment
Health care reform in the 1980s and 1990s has focused on cost containment.168
As with other risk-bearing organizations, HMOs take steps to control costs.169 There
are three main types of cost containment methods utilized by HMOs: Utilization
Review; Panel Selection; and Direct Physician Financial Incentives. All three
methods are discussed in more detail below.
a. Utilization Review
Utilization review has been defined as “a comprehensive evaluation of the
efficiency, appropriateness, and medical necessity of healthcare.”170 These programs
161

See Brasel, supra note 138, at 452.

162

Id. See also discussion infra Part III.A.3.C.2 (discussing physician capitation
reimbursement which is normally a fixed member per month payment or a percentage of the
premium payment for the contracted services).
163

HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 3. See also discussion infra Part
III.A.3.C.2 (discussing physician capitation reimbursement programs).
164

Parver, supra note 119, at 204.

165

Id.

166

Id.

167

Id.

168

Parver, supra note 119, at 202 (arguing that “Corporate America has recognized that
rapidly increasing health care costs decrease competitiveness in the new global market.”). In
addition, health care costs consume an increasingly large share of state and federal and federal
budgets, thus limiting other policy objectives. Id.
169

Pegram at 216.

170

J. Scott Andresen, Is Utilization Review The Practice of Medicine?, 19 J. LEGAL MED.
431, 433 (1998).
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are designed to reduce unnecessary medical services.171 Utilization review is not a
new concept; health insurers have always reviewed medical claims on the basis of
medical necessity.172
There are two main types of utilization review; retrospective and prospective.173
In general, a retrospective utilization review occurs after the medical treatment has
already been given and a prospective review occurs before the treatment has been
conducted.174 Traditionally, utilization review has been conducted on a retrospective
basis and the patient was assured treatment regardless of whether the claim was
eventually paid or denied by the HMO.175
In contrast, prospective review does not carry the same assurances of medical
treatment as retrospective review.176 With prospective review, treatment is often
denied until the questions of payment are settled.177 Prospective review commonly is
required for facility admissions, expensive diagnostic testing, surgical procedures,
and referrals to physicians or facilities outside the particular HMO.178 Thus, through
prospective utilization review the HMO is playing an active role in determining both
the course and scope of the patient’s medical treatment.179
b. Panel Selection
In a panel selection and de-selection system, the HMO manages the care
indirectly by encouraging, and in many cases requiring, its members to use only
certain physicians or facilities.180 Physicians and facilities are often jointly termed
171

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 239. “The purpose of
utilization review is to assure that only procedures deemed medically necessary and
appropriate to the patient’s needs are reimbursed.” Andresen, supra note 170, at 432.
172

Id. at 434. Medical Necessity is a term used by “insurers to describe medical treatment
that is appropriate and rendered in accordance with generally accepted standards of medical
practice.” See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 232. But see supra
note 138 (discussing the lack of agreement in the courts regarding the definition of medical
necessity).
173
See Parver, supra note 119, at 205. In addition, prospective review can be further
divided into pre-admission and concurrent review. Id. See also Andresen, supra note 170, at
434 (describing concurrent utilization review in greater detail).
174

Parver, supra note 119, at 205.

175

See Andresen, supra note 170, at 434.

176

Parver, supra note 119, at 205.

177

Id.

178

See Andresen, supra note 170, at 435.

179

Id. (explaining that “review agents . . . apply the patient’s characteristics to the
preestablished UR [Utilization Review] criteria for the particular diagnosis or treatment at
issue . . . [and] if the criteria are not met . . . the case is forwarded to the UR administrator for
a final determination”). As a result of this process, “utilization review places an MCO, or its
UR director, in a position where they may be substituting their judgement for that of the
attending physician directly providing the care.” Id.
180

Henry T. Greely, Direct Financial Incentives In Managed Care: Unanswered
Questions, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 53, 56 (1996).
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providers.181 The HMO selects the providers that are to be a part of their plan based
on several criteria.182 Most important among the criteria is the cost to the HMO.183
The providers selected by the HMO are encouraged to be economical in their
practice style.184 The providers are aware that if they choose not to meet the HMO’s
standards for both cost and practice style they will no longer be a part of that
particular HMO panel and thus de-selected.185 This situation creates an “indirect”
financial incentive for the providers because de-selection causes the provider to lose
HMO patients and in the end reduces their overall income.186
c. Direct Physician Financial Incentives
Direct financial incentives were also found in the old “fee for service” system
where the more the physician did, the more the physician was paid.187 However, the
financial incentives in a managed care plan are different.188 In the HMO system the
incentives are aimed at discouraging the physician from performing unnecessary
treatment.189 The HMO system focuses on providing the “right” amount of care
rather than performing unnecessary preemptive medicine.190 The Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1990 loosely defined a physician incentive plan as “any
compensation arrangement between an eligible organization and a physician or
physician group that may directly or indirectly have the effect of limiting services
provided with respect to individuals enrolled with the organization.”191 Four general
approaches are usually utilized: salary, capitation, bonus and profit sharing.192

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Id. (explaining that “these costs encompass both the amount of the fees charged by the
provider, often heavily discounted, and the cost of that provider’s style of practice.”).
184
See Greely, supra note 180, at 56. In addition, panel selection programs may reduce
costs by limiting the number of providers in the plan’s network. See ROSENBLATT, supra note
4, at 559.
185
Id. (arguing that “the providers are encouraged to be economical not by direct micromanagement, but by knowing that they will no longer be on the panel should they fail to meet
the plan’s standards for the cost of practice style.”).
186

Id. See also ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 559 (“[t]he threat of network exclusion
represents a potentially powerful tool for ensuring compliance with coverage and utilization
review standards and guidelines.”).
187

See Greely, supra note 180, at 56.

188

Id.

189
Id. See also discussion infra III.A.3.a (discussing the utilization review process and
how that process discourages the performance of unnecessary treatment).
190

Greely, supra note 180, at 56.

191

Id. (quoting The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, S
4204(a)(1)(B), Stat. 1388-108 (1990) amending, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 mm(I).
192

Id. at 57.
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i. Salary
In a salaried situation, the physician’s income is set annually by the HMO
through the issuance of a salary.193 The physician does not have the “fee-for-service”
incentive to do more for the patients in order to make more money.194 The physician
in a salary situation understands that his salary can be raised, lowered, or that he may
even be terminated if the HMO does not agree with his practice patterns.195
ii. Capitation
In a capitation situation, the physician is generally paid a set amount monthly for
each of the individual HMO patients for whom he is responsible.196 To determine the
appropriate amount of payment, the services provided by the physician must be
carefully defined in order to estimate the total cost for the care.197 This determination
may include adjustments for the age and gender of the physician’s patients.198 For
example, the physician may be paid twenty-five dollars per-member, per-month,
which is also referred to as PMPM.199 In addition, many HMOs make a portion of
the capitation payment dependent on the number and length of hospital
admissions.200 For example, if the PMPM is twenty-five dollars, five dollars per
month is set aside and paid to the physician only if certain utilization targets are
met.201
The main point is that the physician is paid the same amount of money each
month for each HMO patient regardless of the number of visits or the cost of the
services that are provided.202 “In its purest form, if the doctor spends less than the
capitated amount, she makes a profit on that patient; if she spends more, she takes a
loss.”203

193
Id. Staff Model HMOs usually pay physicians on a salaried basis. See HEALTH INS.
ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 56. See also discussion infra Part III.A.2.a
(discussing Staff Model HMOs).
194
See Greely, supra note 180, at 57. See also infra notes 112-15 (discussing the fee-forservice payment system).
195
See Greely, supra note 180, at 57. Due to the fact that the performance of the physician
in a Staff Model HMO “has a direct bearing on the financial health of the ‘HMO,’ their
performance is the target of incentives and risk agreements.” See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM.,
PART A, supra note 116, at 56.
196

See Greely, supra note 180, at 57.

197

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 56.

198

Id.

199

Id.

200

Id.

201

Id. at 57.

202

HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 56.

203

Greely, supra note 180, at 57.
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Overall, there is one important difference between salary and capitation as far as
the physician's personal incentives.204 In the capitation situation, physicians have an
incentive to increase the number of patients for whom they have responsibility and in
the salary situation; physicians have an incentive to reduce the number of patients for
whom they have responsibility.205
In principal, capitation and salary are
interchangeable since they both result in physicians being paid a fixed amount of
compensation no matter how many or how few services they provide.206
iii. Bonus
In the bonus situation, the physicians may be paid during a fixed period under
any system but at the end of the period they receive a bonus.207 The bonus is based
on the HMO’s financial results in that year and the individual physician’s
contribution to them.208 The method under which the bonus is determined can
differ.209 Many times bonus arrangements are used to control the use of ancillary
services.210 Ancillary services are defined as health care services that are conducted
by providers other than a primary care physician.211 Examples of ancillary services
are laboratory tests and radiology screenings.212 HMOs may set aside a separate pool
of funds to pay for ancillary services.213 If at the end of the year there are funds still
left in the pool, the funds are distributed to the physicians as a bonus.214 Thus, the

204
See Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 159. However, “even with their [capitation's] built-in
incentive to limit care, pure salary and capitation may not provide sufficient incentive for
physicians to limit the costs of care provided to their patients.” Id. at 159-60 (arguing that
physicians rely on different medical services to provide care to their patients and that
capitation may just cause the physician to “alter the mix of services” provided to their patients,
causing costs overall to actually rise.).
205

Id. at 159.

206

Id.

207

See Greely, supra note 180, at 59.

208

Id.

209

Id.

210

Id. Fee-withholds and expanded capitation are also used to restrain physicians from
overusing ancillary services. See Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 160.
211
See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART B, supra note 5, at 201 (defining “ancillary
services.”). A primary care physician [hereinafter “PCP”] can be defined as the primary
deliverer and manager of an HMO member’s care and is central to controlling costs and
utilization. Id. at 210. The PCP provides basic care to the member including the basic care of
the member and any follow up care that may be needed. Id. Usually PCPs are physisians
practicing in such areas as internal medicine, family practice, and pediatrics. Id. at 211.
212

Id. at 89.

213

See Orentlicher, supra note 8, at 160.

214

Id.
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physicians recognize that they can increase the amount of their compensation if they
reduce the use of ancillary services.215
iv. Profit Sharing
Under the profit sharing method physicians receive a negotiated share of the
HMO’s profits.216 The physicians may receive this share as owners of the plan or
through a contractual agreement.217 This method is sometimes used to determine the
bonus payment as described above.218 Individual profit-sharing plans may differ
greatly.219
All of these methods can be used and many of them can be combined.220 For
example, a salary system will usually have some kind of bonus that may include
some profit sharing.221 A bonus may be determined as a result of a comparison to
expected capitation results and a capitation system itself may include a bonus.222
“The number of possible systems of direct financial incentives is virtually
unlimited.”223
d. The Use of Direct Financial Incentives By HMOs
Due to the various combinations of financial incentives that may be used by
HMOs, it is difficult to ascertain the number of HMOs using a certain incentive
system and, furthermore, the number of patients receiving care under each financial
arrangement.224 However, we do know that financial incentives are greatly used.225
In 1995, a report based on California HMOs found that financial incentives were
commonly used by HMOs.226 The report stated that a 1987 survey indicated that
eighty-five percent of California HMOs used financial incentives and a 1988 study

215
Id. (indicating that bonus-type “[f]inancial incentives to limit care discourage
physicians from providing high levels of care by transferring from the health plan to the
physician some of the financial risk of costly medical care.”).
216

See Greely, supra note 180, at 59.

217

Id.

218

Id.

219

Id.

220

Id.

221

Greely, supra note 180, at 59.

222

Id.

223

Id.

224

Id. (stating that “our next problem is to determine how often each [reimbursement]
method is actually being used.”).
225

Id. at 60.

226

See Greely, supra note 180, at 60 (discussing a report found in HEALTH EDUC. &
HUMAN SERV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE, MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: MORE COMPETITION
AND OVERSIGHT WOULD IMPROVE CALIFORNIA’S EXPANSION PLAN (1995) (GAO Report)). The
report noted, “there are no reliable current data regarding the extent to which HMOs use
financial incentive arrangements or the prevalence of the different types of arrangements.” Id.
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showed that ninety-five percent of HMOs used them.227 The California report
concluded “it has become increasingly common for HMOs to capitate physicians . . .
for all medical services including inpatient care.”228
Information on a national level has not proved to be any more helpful.229 We do
know that some forms of compensation are more popular than others in certain HMO
settings. For example, staff models prefer salary systems, IPA models do not.230
Profit sharing models are not popular while capitation systems are popular.231
e. Cases Discussing the Use of Financial Incentives
Legal involvement regarding the question of whether an HMO can be held liable
for medical malpractice because of financial incentives or financial risk imposed on
physicians, is in its infancy.232 Currently, there are few published court opinions
discussing the subject; however, legal involvement in this area is likely to grow
significantly.233
An unpublished Michigan trial court opinion allowed a jury to evaluate how the
physician financial incentives operated in a particular case.234 In Bush v. Dake235 the
227

Id.

228

Id.

229

Id.

230

See Greeley, supra note 180, at 61. In addition, it is difficult to calculate how many
patients are covered by what kinds of direct financial incentive systems. See Id. “Even when
a plan uses the same general approach in compensating physicians, its arrangements with
different groups may include different provisions, leading to different incentives.” Id. Thus,
we cannot just find out what methods different HMOs use and then add up the number of their
members. See Id. at 61-62. “To determine how many patients are covered by each type of
direct financial incentive system, we would have to ask HMOs what systems they use to pay
which physicians, and then ask how many of their members use each set of differently
compensated physicians.” Id. at 62.
231

Greely, supra note 180, at 61.

232

See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1069.

233

Id. See Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 99 Cal. App. 3d 560 (1979) (regarding
one of the few published court opinions discussing physician financial incentive programs).
This case involved a suit against HMO alleging negligent delay of a biopsy as the cause of
patient’s death. Id. at 564. The plaintiff’s third cause of action rested on the theory that the
health plan utilized a system whereby the individual doctors were encouraged, by an incentive
plan, to be conservative in ordering unnecessary tests and treatments. Id. at 565. The plaintiff
argued that he was fraudulently led to believe that he would receive the “best quality” of care
and treatment. Id. The court dismissed claim of HMO fraudulent concealment of physician
financial incentives on the grounds that such incentives were recommended by professional
organizations and “required” by the HMO Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. § 300e. Id. (holding that
“we can see in the plan no suggestion that individual doctors act negligently or that they
refrain from recommending whatever diagnostic procedures or treatments the accepted
standards of their profession require.”).
234

ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1069-71. The Rosenblatt case book has printed the
unpublished 1989 Saginaw County, Michigan trial court opinion. Id. The case is Bush v.
Dake, No. 86-25767NM-2 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1989) (unreported). All facts stated are taken from
the version printed in the case book.
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plaintiffs alleged that their HMO’s system of financial incentives was contrary to
public policy and the use of this system constituted negligence, gross negligence,
fraud, a breach of trust, and a tortious breach of the relationship between the plaintiff
patient and her doctors.236 The case arose out of the alleged failure by the HMO
physician to timely diagnose and treat the plaintiff’s cervical cancer.237 The HMO in
this case set aside a certain amount of money each year for a “referral pool” and a
“hospital/ancillary pool” for the HMO physicians.238 A referral is the transfer of a
patient from their primary doctor to a specialty physician for special care or
diagnostic testing.239 As patients are referred to specialists, money in these funds is
depleted.240 Any money that is left in these pools at the end of the year is divided
amongst the HMO and its physicians.241
The plaintiffs contended it was this incentive agreement that led in part to the late
diagnosis of her cervical cancer.242 The plaintiff had requested a referral from her
primary physician in order to see a specialist in obstetrics and gynecology regarding
vaginal bleeding.243 The plaintiff was given a referral to see the specialist; however,
when she requested an additional referral due to her persistent condition, she was not
allowed one.244 It turned out that a simple diagnostic test, a pap smear, would have
revealed the cancer at an earlier stage.245 Pap smears can be done by the primary
physician but the primary physician is not paid anything in addition to the existing
capitation payment for performing the test.246
The court dismissed the plaintiff’s allegation that the incentive programs were
contrary to public policy; however, the court found that there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the HMO’s incentive system in and of itself proximately
contributed to the malpractice in the case.247 The court stated “[d]ocumentary
235

ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1069-71.

236

See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1069.

237

Id. at 1070.

238

Id.

239

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM., PART A, supra note 116, at 237 (defining “referral”).

240

See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1070.

241

Id.

242

Id. Plaintiffs contended that “the system in question is wrongful, in that it provides the
physicians involved with financial disincentives to properly treat, refer, and hospitalize
patients.” Id. at 1070-71. The plaintiffs further contended that the court should find “a) that
the system violates public policy and b) that there is a jury question presented as to whether
the system itself contributed to the malpractice in this case.” Id. at 1071.
243

See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1070.

244

Id.

245

Id. A Pap test is an examination under a microscope of cells collected from the cervix
that are placed on a slide and specially stained to reveal cancerous and non-cancerous changes
in the cells. MEDICINENET.COM MEDICAL DICTIONARY, supra note 21. Cervical and uterine
cancer can be detected in their early stages with this test. See id.
246

See ROSENBLATT, supra note 4, at 1070.

247

Id. at 1071.
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evidence has been presented which supports the plaintiffs’ theory that the manner in
which the system operated in this case contributed to the improper treatment and
delay in diagnosis of Mrs. Bush’s cancerous condition.”248
In addition, cases have alleged that HMO financial arrangements create personal
financial interests for the physician, which are against the patient’s best interests. A
noteworthy case, Fox v. Health Net,249 concerned the denial by an HMO of an
experimental treatment for metastatic breast cancer, which resulted in a jury verdict
of eighty-nine million dollars against a California HMO.250 The case included
charges that the personal, financial interests of the physician medical director making
the decision on the procedure, affected the result.251
A third case involved a cancer patient who died in her early thirties of colon
cancer.252 The complaint alleged that the cancer should have been diagnosed at an
earlier and more treatable stage, but that the capitation agreement created by the
patient’s physicians made them reluctant to spend the money needed for the relevant
tests.253 The suit did not include the health plan but instead added a cause of action
for breach of fiduciary duty, arguing that the managed care contract created an
impermissible conflict between the interests of the patient and the physician.254
Before the case went to the jury, the judge granted a directed verdict on this cause of
action, removing it from the jury.255 However, the testimony was not forgotten by
the jury as they returned a verdict of $3 million on the remaining malpractice
charges.256
Although the previous cases are unpublished decisions, they are proof of the
existence of claims based on breaches of fiduciary duty premised on financial

248

Id. (holding that the question should be submitted to the jury for determination at trial).

249

See Greely, supra note 180.

250

See Greely, supra note 180, at 75. The Fox case was settled before the appeal was
heard, so it did not result in a reported opinion. The case is well described in Christine
Woolsey, Jury Hits HMO for Coverage Denial, BUS. INS., Jan. 3, 1994, at 1, 23 (describing
the complaint and the decision of the California Superior Court). See also Greely, supra note
180, at n.42.
251

See Greely, supra note 180, at 75 (explaining that the HMO’s medical director was the
person who decide whether the procedure sought was experimental).
252
Id. The facts from the Ching case are taken from the Greely article. Greely bases his
description of the case from a copy of the complaint and David R. Olmos, Cutting Medical
Costs or Cutting Corners?, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1995, at A1. See Greely, supra note 180, at
76, n.43.
253
Id. at 75. The patient was a member of an HMO and received her care through a
physician group that received $27.94 a month for her care. See Id. The complaint alleged that
the physician group had to pay for diagnostic tests or procedures by specialists. See Id.
254

Id. at 76. “Mrs. Ching’s husband and young son did not sue the health plan, probably
because of the barriers ERISA imposes.” See Greely, supra note 180, at 76. See also
discussion infra Part III.B.1 (explaining ERISA preemption).
255

See Greely, supra note 180, at 76.

256

Id. Note that this amount was reduced to $700,000 as a result of California’s cap on
non-economic damages in medical malpractice case. See Id.
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incentives. These cases present evidence that financial arrangements may present
great influence in the decisions that physicians make for their patients.
B. The Effect of ERISA on Managed Care
ERISA has been called “the most important law affecting health care in the
United States.”257 “[ERISA] was designed to create a comprehensive, uniform
regulatory system for self-funded employee benefit plans. . . .”258 ERISA is
applicable to most employer-sponsored health plans, which means that ERISA’s
guidelines cover more than one-half of all American workers.259 ERISA does not
apply to self-employed persons or to persons whose health care insurance is not
provided by their employer.260
1. ERISA Preemption
In order to maintain uniformity by avoiding conflicting state standards, ERISA
“supersedes any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any
employee benefit plan.”261 The preemption applies to common law action, as well as
actions instituted under state statutes if the actions “relate to” an employee benefits
plan.262 “The preemption clause of ERISA has been given ‘its broadest common
sense meaning’ by the Supreme Court.”263 The necessary relation is established by
showing the state law has a “connection with or reference to [an employee benefit
plan].”264 In terms of HMO liability, the preemption clause of ERISA must be
reviewed in order to determine the validity of state law.265 When a state law cause of

257

Brasel, supra note 138, at 453.

258

HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM. PART B, supra note 5, at 169 (explaining that “ERISA does
not dictate the substance of employee benefit plans, but it does impose fiduciary duties on the
administrators of such plans, as well as reporting and disclosure requirements.”).
259

See Brasel, supra note 138, at 453-54 (explaining that “when there is a dispute
involving an employee benefit plan, the statute is triggered.”).
260

Id. at 454. In addition, the statute does not apply to employee benefit plans when the
employee works for either a church or the government. See id.
261

Parver, supra note 119, at 224 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)).

262

Id.

263

Id. See Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (stating “Congress used the words ‘relate to’ in section
514(a) in their broad sense”). See also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 739-40 (1985) (stating that ERISA broadly pre-empts state law); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47 (1987) (stating “in both cases [Shaw and Metropolitan] the phrase
‘relate to’ was given its broad common-sense meaning, such that a state law ‘relates’ to a
benefit plan ‘in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan.’”).
264

Parver, supra note 119, at 225 (quoting Shaw at 97).

265

See Brasel, supra note 138, at 454. When conducting a pre-emption analysis, one must
first ask “whether the case involves an ERISA-regulated plan.” Id. at 455. “The existence of
an ERISA plan is a question of fact, to be answered in light of all the surrounding
circumstances from the point of view of a reasonable person.” Id. (quoting McClellan v.
Health Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1063 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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action is preempted by ERISA, the claim cannot be pursued and must be
dismissed.266 Thereafter, the plaintiff’s only remedy is found in the remedy
provisions of the ERISA statute.
The scope of the ERISA’s preemption clause has been drawn into question and
still remains unclear.267 Section 514 of ERISA is the substantial preemption
section.268 In deciding whether federal law preempts a state provision, the question is
one of congressional intent.269 “[T]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate
touchstone.”270 In order to find Congress’ intent, the statutory language and structure
must be reviewed.271 The Court finds the task of discerning congressional intent
considerably simplified due to the broadly worded preemption provision of § 514.272
The key to § 514(a) is found in the words “relate to.”273 Congress has used these
words in their broadest sense by rejecting more limited preemption language and by
using equally broad language in defining the state laws that would be preempted.274
A state law may “relate to” a benefit plan and thus be preempted even if the law is
not specifically designed to affect such plans or the effect is only indirect.275 On the
other hand, preemption is not precluded simply because a state law is consistent with
ERISA’s substantive requirements.276 Overall, § 514 indicates Congress’ intent to
establish the regulation of employee welfare benefit plans “as exclusively a federal
concern.”277
266

Id. at 454.

267

Id.

268

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM. PART B, supra note 5, at 170 (“[s]ection 514 of ERISA
broadly establishes the federal preemption of any and all state laws that relate to any employee
benefit plan.”).
269
See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137-38 (“[t]he question of
whether a certain state action is preempted by federal law is one of congressional intent.”).
270

Id. (“[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone” (quoting Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 208 (1985))).
271

Id. (“to discern Congress’ intent we examine the explicit statutory language and the
structure and purpose of the statute.”).
272
Id. The Court quotes 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (“§ 514(a) of ERISA is as follows
‘Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not
exempt under 1003(b) of this title.’”).
273

Ingersoll-Rand at 138.

274

Id. Such state laws under the preemption include “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations,
or other State action having the effect of law.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1) (1994).
275

Ingersoll-Rand at 139.

276

Id.

277

See New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins.
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656-657 (1995) (“we have found that in passing § 514(a), Congress
intended ‘to ensure that plans and plan sponsors would be subject to a uniform body of
benefits law; the goal was to minimize the administrative and financial burden of complying
with conflicting directives among States or between States and the Federal government . . . ,
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2. Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA
A fiduciary within the meaning of ERISA must be someone acting in the capacity
of a manager, administrator, or financial advisor to a “plan.”278 A “plan” has been
defined as a scheme decided upon in advance.279 Plans include rules governing the
collection of premiums, definition of benefits, submission of claims and resolution of
disagreements over the entitlements of services.280 ERISA provides that fiduciaries
shall discharge their duties with respect to a plan “solely in the interests of the
participants and beneficiaries. . . for the exclusive purpose of (i) providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable expenses of
administering the plan.”281
The responsibilities imposed by ERISA sound much like their source in the
common law of trusts.282 The common law of trusts charges fiduciaries with a duty
of loyalty to guarantee the beneficiaries’ interests and to administer the trust solely in
the interests of the beneficiary.283 The seminal case on the duty of loyalty in the
partnership setting, Meinhard v. Salmon, reinforces the strength of the duty by
stating, “[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market
place,. . . [n]ot honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then
the standard of behavior.”284
Unlike a trustee under the common law, a fiduciary under ERISA may have a
financial interest adverse to the beneficiaries.285 However, ERISA does require that

[and to prevent] the potential for conflict in substantive law . . . requiring the tailoring of plans
and employer conduct to the peculiarities of the law of each jurisdiction’.’’ (quoting IngersollRand at 142).
278

Pegram at 223 (quoting 29 U.S.C §§ 1002(21)(A)(i)-(iii) (1999)).

279

Id. (“one is left to the common understanding of the word ‘plan’ as referring to a
scheme decided upon on advance.”).
280

Id.

281

29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1)(A) (1999). In addition, fiduciaries must discharge their duties
(B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters
would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims; (C) by
diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and (D) in accordance
with the documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1).
282

Pegram at 224.

283

Id.

284

Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo, J). (“many forms of conduct
permissible in a workaday world for those acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound
by fiduciary ties.”).
285

See Pegram, 530 U.S. at 224 (explaining that employers can be ERISA fiduciaries and
still take actions to the disadvantage of the ERISA beneficiaries when the act like employers
(e.g., firing a beneficiary for reasons unrelated to the ERISA plan or modifying the terms of
the plan as allowed by ERISA to provide less generous benefits)).
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the fiduciary act in adherence to the duty when making fiduciary decisions.286 Plan
administrators are fiduciaries only to the extent that they act in such a capacity in
relation to a plan.287 Thus, “[i]n every case charging breach of ERISA fiduciary duty
. . . the threshold question is not whether the actions of some person employed to
provide services under the plan adversely affected a plan beneficiary’s interests, but
whether that person was acting as a fiduciary (that is, performing a fiduciary
function) when taking the action subject to the complaint.”288
3. The “Savings Clause” and Common-Law Claims
While ERISA broadly preempts state laws that relate to an employee-benefit
plan, that preemption is substantially qualified by the “insurance savings clause.”289
This clause states that nothing in ERISA “shall be construed to exempt or relieve any
person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities.”290 This clause saves state laws, which regulate insurance, banking, or
securities, from preemption.291 Although the “savings clause” on its face would
seem to protect claims regarding employee health benefit plans that provide health
insurance from ERISA preemption, and thus allow the claims under state law, it is
not that simple.292
The seminal Supreme Court case discussing the “savings clause” and its impact
on the insurance industry is Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v.
Massachusetts.293 In this case, the Court set forth a three-factor test to establish
whether a state law falls under the “saving clause,” and hence is not preempted by
ERISA.294 The factors are: “(1) whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder’s risk; (2) whether the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; (3) whether the practice is
limited to entities within the insurance industry.”295
The Court applied the three-factor test to a common-law cause of action for
breach of contract and tortious bad faith against an insurance company in Pilot Life
Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.296 The complaint in Pilot Life alleged improper
286
Id. (“ERISA does require, however, that the fiduciary with two hats wear only one at a
time, and where the fiduciary hat when making fiduciary decisions.”).
287

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A) (1999).

288

Pegram at 226.

289

See Metropolitan Life Ins.Co. at 739.

290

29 U.S.C § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1999).

291

Id.

292

See Griner, supra note 12, at 914.

293

Metropolitan Life Ins.Co. at 724.

294

Id. at 743 (stating that “cases interpreting the scope of the McCarren-Ferguson Act have
identified three criteria relevant to determining whether a particular practice falls within that
Act’s reference to the ‘business of insurance.”).
295

Id. See also Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119, 129 (1982); Group Life
& Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
296

Pilot Life Ins. Co. at 41.
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processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan.297 The Court
found that the common-law of bad faith does not effect a spreading of policyholder
risk, that the connection to the insurer-insured relationship is “attenuated” at best.298
The Court stated that roots of bad faith are “firmly planted” in tort and contract law;
the application of these principals was not limited to the insurance industry.299
Herein lies the roadblock for patients bringing tort or contract claims against their
HMO. Based on Pilot Life, the savings clause will not save any state laws of “general
application,” such as common-law principals of contract and tort.300 Therefore, any
type of state tort action against a HMO for negligence in a utilization review decision
or medical necessity determination under an ERISA qualified plan would not fall
under the “savings clause” for insurance regulation and the common law cause of
action is preempted by ERISA.301 A patient bringing a claim of this kind would thus
need to prove the claim using the ERISA statute and not relevant state law.
“Perhaps the most unjust aspect of ERISA preemption is that it destroys a
plaintiff’s chance at a level playing field.”302 “When a health plan is an ERISA plan,
preemption is fairly certain for at least some claims that otherwise would be
viable.”303 However, when a health plan does not fall under ERISA, there is no
ERISA preemption and the patient is allowed full recovery on the same theories of
poor care and wrongdoing by an HMO.304 In contrast, patients in health plans that
fall under ERISA guidelines can only recover the value of the benefit denied.305
Many feel this is an inadequate remedy for a patient who has been seriously injured
or has died due to the negligence of an HMO.306 “[C]ourts . . . are becoming

297
Id. at 43 (“although Dedeaux sought permanent disability benefits following the 1975
accident, Pilot Life terminated his benefits after two years.”).
298

Id. at 50-51.

299

Id. at 50.

300

See Griner, supra note 12, at 916.

301
Id. Griner also points out that not every purchase of group health insurance by an
employer constitutes an employee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA. See id. (citing
Fort Halifax Packaging Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987)). The Fort Halifax ruling has
been referred to as a “significant check on the sweep of the Pilot Life decision.” See id.
302

Parver, supra note 119, at 228.

303

Id.

304
Id. (explaining that many times such cases stem from the denial of care pursuant to an
HMOs utilization review in which a patient has lost the opportunity to undergo treatment
when time was of the essence).
305

Id. at 207.

306

Id. Congress has been called on to close the ERISA loophole:
In other contexts throughout our legal system, foreseeable injuries caused by a failure
to deliver what has been promised must be compensated. Under ERISA, however,
working men and women give their labor in exchange for the promise of benefits, but
are not compensated for injures when benefits are wrongly withheld. Under this
system, an insurance company or HMO may stubbornly refuse to provide what is
promised in the hope that the worker will not finance a court battle, and even if she
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increasingly wary of letting third party payors go entirely ‘scott-free,’ and are
devising new techniques to hold payors liable either through traditional agency
principals or more direct routes.”307
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court in the case of Herdrich v. Pegram should have adhered to the
Appellate Court’s ruling and remanded the case back to the trial court for further
review. Two main arguments support a remand: (1) contrary to the Supreme Court
ruling, a fiduciary duty exists between an HMO enrollee and the HMO under
ERISA, and (2) physician financial incentive agreements play a direct role in
physician decision making. Both reasons are discussed in detail below. In addition,
in realizing that financial incentives will continue to be a crucial part of managed
care, solutions will be explored as to minimize harm to HMO members.
A. The Fiduciary Duty
1. The ERISA Standard
In order for a member of an ERISA HMO to properly state a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty, the member’s complaint must allege facts that set forth: (1) that the
defendants are plan fiduciaries; (2) that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties; and (3) that a cognizable loss resulted.308 The Appellate Court held that
Herdrich’s pleadings met each of the three requirements.309 The Supreme Court,
however, held that mixed eligibility and treatment decisions made by an HMO were
not fiduciary acts within the meaning of ERISA.310
a. A Fiduciary Under ERISA
ERISA defines the term “fiduciary” as a person who (i) exercises discretionary
authority or discretionary control respecting management of the plan or exercises any
authority of control respecting management or disposition of its assets or . . . (iii)
who has any discretionary authority or discretionary responsibility in the

does, years of litigation will produce no more than an order to provide the withheld
benefits.
Olena Berg, Ass’t Sec’y, Pension & Welfare Benefits Admin., ERISA Preemption: Remedies
for Denied or Delayed Health Claims, Senate Subcommittee on Labor, Health & Human
Servs., Education & Related Agencies, 105th Cong. (1998). See Parver, supra note 119, at
n.38.
307

Id. at 207.

308

Herdrich at 369 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)).

309

Id. (holding “[w]e are of the opinion that Herdrich’s pleadings have more than
sufficiently alleged each of these three elements”). See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying
text (discussing the Appellate Court decision).
310

See Pegram at 235 (holding “[m]ixed eligibility decisions by HMO physicians are not
fiduciary decisions under ERISA. Herdrich’s ERISA count fails to state an ERISA claim, and
the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.”). See supra notes 99-111 and
accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision).
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administration of such plan.”311 When Congress enacted ERISA, it intended that this
statutory definition of fiduciary be broadly interpreted.312 “A fiduciary need not be a
person with direct access to the assets of the plan. . . . [c]onduct alone may . . .
impose a fiduciary obligation.”313
The Court itself describes the defining feature of an HMO as “receipt of a fixed
fee for each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to provide specified health
care if needed.”314 This element of the HMO system causes Carle to fit neatly into
the definition established by ERISA. Carle had, at a minimum, discretionary
responsibility in the administration of the plan by operating a pre-paid health
insurance plan that provides both medical and hospital services to its members.315
Mr. Herdrich’s employer contracted with Carle in order to provide medical benefits
to their employees, which would cause Carle to have discretionary responsibility
over plan administration.316
If Dr. Pegram was a “fee for service” provider, an argument may have been made
that the sole administration of the care was managed by the physician due to the
large amount of physician control in this type of system.317 However, in an HMO
system like Carle’s, in which the care is managed by Carle through cost-controlling
measures, Carle had at least discretionary responsibility over the administration of
the plan.318
In addition, it has been found that “conduct alone” may impose a fiduciary
obligation.319 Any person with a specific duty imposed on them may be deemed to
be a fiduciary.320 Carle provided pre-paid medical services to the employees of State
Farm Insurance, Mr. Herdrich’s employer.321 Furthermore, Carle accepted the
“duty” as Ms. Herdrich’s health care insurer by establishing a relationship with State

311

29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing the fiduciary duty under
ERISA).
312

See supra notes 261, 266.

313

Herdrich at 370 (“it is the clear intention of the Committee that any person with a
specific duty imposed upon him by this statute be deemed to be a fiduciary.”).
314

Pegram at 218. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (defining an HMO).

315

See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text (discussing Carle HMO).

316

See Pegram at 214. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (describing Carle’s
relationship with State Farm Insurance, Mr. Herdrich’s employer).
317
See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (describing the “fee-for-service” physician payment
system). See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (describing how “fee-for-service”
allows the physician much control).
318

See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (describing Carle’s relationship with
State Farm Insurance, Mr. Herdrich’s employer). See also, Herdrich (“the defining feature of
an HMO is receipt of a fixed fee for each patient enrolled under the terms of a contract to
provide specified health care if needed.”).
319

Id. at 370.

320

See supra discussion Part III.B.2 (describing the fiduciary duty under ERISA).

321

See supra note 316.
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Farm Insurance.322 Carle had the duty of administering Ms. Herdrich’s medical care,
and decided where members could receive their care, urging the members to use
Carle’s own physicians if at all possible.323 This conduct on the part of Carle
establishes a fiduciary duty under the “broad” ERISA standard.
b. The Role of Utilization Review
i. Control of the Claims Process
An important factor in determining fiduciary status is the retention of control of
the claims process.324 The exclusive right to determine all disputed and non-routine
claims is an important factor as well.325 The very nature of the cost-containment
tactics used by HMOs controls the claims process.326
The use of utilization review as a cost-containment tactic controls the claims
process by deciding between those patient claims that are paid and those that are
denied. For example, pre-authorization programs will deny patient claims that are
not pre-approved by the HMO.327 In prospective review, coverage can either be
approved or denied even before the medical service has been performed.328 Every
type of managed care organization uses utilization review programs.329 Carle’s
utilization review system caused them to have retention over the claims process and
thus a fiduciary status existed between Carle and the patient.
ii. Liability and Utilization Review
In addition, case law shows that liability has been found solely based on the use
of utilization review programs.330 A material question of liability is found in
situations in which the organization’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing

322

See supra note 276 and accompanying text (stating “[a] fiduciary within the meaning of
ERISA must be someone acting in the capacity of a manager, administrator, or financial
advisor to a plan.”).
323
See supra note 42 and accompanying text (describing Carle’s panel provider program),
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.b (discussing HMO panel selection in general).
324

See Harris Trust & Sav. Bank v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co., 57 F.3d 608, 613
(7th Cir. 1995) (holding employer was the plan fiduciary because they had retained the right to
direct and control the claims procedures and practices, as well as the right to determine all
disputed claims). In addition, the fund was created and fully funded by the employer. See Id.
325

Herdrich at 370.

326

See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing types of cost-containment strategies employed by
HMOs).
327

See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM. PART B, supra note 5, at 92.

328

See supra discussion Part III.A.3.a (describing utilization review). See supra notes 16669 and accompanying text (discussing prospective review).
329
See HEALTH INS. ASS’N OF AM. PART A, supra note 116, at 68 (“UR [Utilization
Review] programs are used by every type of managed care organization.”).
330

See Wickline v. California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (1986), and, Wilson v. Blue Cross of
Southern Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (1990).
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the complained circumstances.331 Although the “substantial factor” test has been
used in the utilization review setting only, an argument can be made that the inability
of Ms. Herdrich to receive a timely ultrasound was a “substantial factor” in the
rupturing of her appendix.332 In fact, case law dealing directly with liability based on
physician financial incentive programs has also utilized a causation approach.333
The Bush334 case is an example of the judiciary’s willingness to review a
causation approach in determining HMO liability.335 In Bush, the court found that
there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the HMO’s incentive scheme
caused the late diagnosis of the plaintiff’s cervical cancer.336 The causation theory
was not rejected based on the idea that the method in which the incentive scheme
operated, may have contributed to the improper treatment of the patient.337
In Herdrich, the Supreme Court denied the existence of a fiduciary duty under
ERISA between Carle and Ms. Herdrich.338 However, the administrative ability that
Carle retains, as exemplified through the use of utilization management procedures,
causes them to retain control over the claims process, which is an important factor in
determining fiduciary status under ERISA.339 The control of the claims process,
compounded with the case law finding HMO liability based on the use of utilization
review processes, points to the existence of a fiduciary duty even under the ERISA
standards.
c. Mixed Eligibility Decisions and Fiduciary Duties
The Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend Carle or any other HMO to
be treated as a fiduciary to the extent that it makes mixed eligibility decisions acting
through its physicians.340 “[P]ure eligibility decisions turn on the plan’s coverage of

331
See Wilson at 883 (“[t]here is substantial evidence that Western Medical’s decision not
to approve further hospitalization was a substantial factor in bringing about the decedent’s
demise.”). Id.
332

See supra note 24 and accompanying text (arguing that the delay in Ms. Herdrich’s
ultrasound caused her appendix to rupture).
333
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.e (discussing the unpublished Michigan trial court
opinion in Bush v. Dake). Bush stated that “[d]ocumentary evidence has been presented which
supports the plaintiff’s theory that the manner in which the system operated in this contributed
to the improper treatment and delay in diagnosis of Mrs. Bush’s cancerous condition.” Id.
334

ROSENBLATT, supra note 4.

335

See supra note 331.

336

See supra notes 246-47 and accompanying text (discussing the courts decision in Bush).

337

See supra notes 237-40 and accompanying text (discussing the incentive scheme in the
Bush case).
338
See supra notes 105-11 and accompanying text (stating the Supreme Court’s review of
the fiduciary duty in Herdrich).
339

See supra note 322 (explaining that the retention of control in the claims process has
proven to be an indicator of the existence of a fiduciary duty).
340

Pegram at 230.
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a particular condition or medical procedure.”341 In contrast, “treatment decisions are
choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a patient’s condition.”342 The
Court held that these two decisions are inextricably mixed like countless medical
administrative decisions made every day.343 Thus, the Court concluded that the
decision made on Herdrich’s treatment course, while incorrect, was completely made
by Pegram, not Carle.344
When HMOs “direct” where and what procedures will be given through their
utilization review programs, they do not consider themselves to be dictating to the
physicians how to practice medicine.345 They view their actions as merely setting
limits through the use of medical necessity determinations regarding the treatments
for which the employers are willing or obligated to pay.346 In essence, the
administrators argue that they are only making “business decisions.”347 Physicians,
however, claim that these decisions made through utilization review systems do
indeed equate to a medical decision made by the HMO.348
Traditionally, physicians had a monopoly on the right to determine the
appropriate course of medical treatment for their patients.349 As a result, physicians
have bore the sole liability when a medical decision was found to be negligent.350
“The advent of managed care and cost-containment mechanisms has altered
decision-making authority.”351 Accordingly, a portion of the liability occurring from
these decisions must also be shifted onto the managed care plans. The decision of
medical treatment is no longer solely left up to the physician.
Case law also reinforces the idea that utilization review decisions are indeed
medical decisions. The seminal case in this area is Corcoran v. United
HealthCare.352 The Fifth Circuit held that the utilization review decisions made by
341

Id. at 228 (defining HMO eligibility decisions).

342

Id. (defining physician treatment decisions).

343
See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s analysis of
“mixed eligibility” decisions in Herdrich).
344

Pegram at 228.

345

See Andresen, supra note 170, at 441.

346

Id.

347
Id. at 442 (stating that “these decisions involve coverage or reimbursement
determinations that are in place to effectuate the cost-containment objectives at the core of
managed care.”).
348
Id. Some physicians argue that HMO administrators are exercising medical judgment
without sufficient knowledge or ability to determine medical necessity and others argue that it
interferes with the physician-patient relationship. Id. Courts and administrative bodies are
equally divided on the issue. See Anderson, supra note 170, at 442.
349
Id. at 446. See discussion supra Part III.A.1 (describing the “fee-for-service” physician
payment system); See supra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (describing how “fee-forservice” allows the physician much control).
350

See Andresen, supra note 170, at 446.

351

Id.

352

Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
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the HMO were, in fact, medical decisions.353 The court stated that “[b]y its very
nature, a system of prospective decision making influences the beneficiary’s choice
among treatment options to a far greater degree than does the theoretical risk of
disallowance of a claim facing a beneficiary in a retrospective system.”354
A decision was made that Ms. Herdrich would wait eight days in order to have
her ultrasound procedure at a Carle facility.355 This treatment decision, although
defined by the Court as mixed, was made by the HMO through their use of a
“preferred provider” for ultrasound treatment located fifty miles away.356 Carle
required that plan patients receive their medical care from Carle facilities.357
Whatever the term that is placed on the decision, it was made by the HMO and
liability should be shared with Dr. Pegram by the HMO.358
In addition, the Supreme Court argues treatment decisions made by the HMO
have only a “limited” resemblance to the usual business of traditional trustees in the
classic fiduciary relationship.359 The Court readily admits that “physicians (like
regular trustees) draw on resources held for others and make decisions to distribute
them in accordance with entitlements expressed in a written instrument.”360
However, the Court states that trustees do not make treatment decisions because
these decisions are left to the discretion of the physicians.361 Herein lies the flaw in
the Court’s argument. In modern times, physicians do not make treatment decisions;
they are made by the HMO.362 This switch in the decision-making power of
physicians is evidenced by the use of utilization review and panel selection.363
Utilization review controls the procedures ordered by the physician and panel
selection controls the providers in which the physician may refer the patient.364
These controls were not utilized in the former fee-for-service system but are
mainstays in today’s health care environment. This shift in the control of physician
353

Id. at 1331.

354

Id. at 1332 (interestingly, while giving an indication that utilization review involves
something more than an administrative question, the court did not allow the Corcorans to
proceed at trial based on the fact that ERISA preempted any recovery).
355

See supra note 28 and accompanying text (describing the eight-day delay in receiving
the ultrasound treatment).
356

See supra notes 27-29 (discussing Carle’s use of the hospital fifty miles away).

357

See supra notes 40-42 (discussing Carle’s use of “preferred providers” for their
member’s care).
358
But see Wickline, at 1645 (“[t]he physician who complies without protest with the
limitations imposed by a third-party payor, when his medical judgment dictates otherwise,
cannot avoid his ultimate responsibility for his patient’s care.”).
359

Pegram at 231.

360

Id.

361

Id. at 232.

362

See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the different types of cost-containment
programs used by HMOs).
363

Id.

364

See discussion supra Part III.A.3.a-b (discussing utilization review and panel selection).
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decision-making has caused the physician to resemble the trustee in the classic trust
relationship.365 Thus, in modern times trust relationship analogies may be utilized in
describing the relationship between the HMO and the patient.
The Court also argued it was “questionable” whether Congress had mixed
eligibility decisions in mind when it provided that decisions in administering a plan
were fiduciary in nature.366 The problem with the Court’s argument is that when
ERISA was first passed in 1974, HMO and other third-party payment systems did
not exist in the same manner as they do today.367 It would have been impossible for
the drafters of ERISA to imagine that HMOs would eventually manage health care
and decisions. Despite changes in the health care system since ERISA’s birth, the
congressional intent on which ERISA was based should still cover mixed eligibility
decisions made in modern HMOs.368
Congressional intent in drafting a statute is first reviewed when attempting to
decipher when an action falls under the statute.369 By drawing an analogy to the
pension situation in which ERISA was created, it can be concluded that it was the
intent of Congress to protect patients and not to fully shelter HMO systems from
liability. ERISA was first established to protect retirees from the difficulties that
they experienced in receiving their pension payments and the financial
mismanagement that had often deprived the retirees of their benefits.370 Retirees
were the persons the ERISA statute was created to protect. In the modern health care
system, it is the HMO members that the statute should protect.
Based on the plain definition utilized by ERISA in determining who is a
fiduciary, Carle clearly is in a fiduciary relationship with Ms. Herdrich. An
important factor in determining fiduciary status is the retention of control over the
claims process. Through Carle’s use of modern HMO cost-containment techniques,
like utilization review, Carle had control of the processing of its member’s medical
claims. Recent case law has shown that HMOs have been held liable on the
decisions made through the use of utilization review procedures. In addition,
utilization review decisions are medical decisions made by an HMO that should be
considered fiduciary in nature. Thus, all of these factors demonstrate that a fiduciary
relationship between Carle and Ms. Herdrich existed.

365

See supra notes 280-86 and accompanying text (describing the classic trust fiduciary
relationship).
366
Pegram at 232 (“when Congress took up the subject of fiduciary responsibility under
ERISA, it concentrated on a fiduciaries’ financial decisions, focusing on pension plans.”).
367

See Griner, supra note 12, at 920 (“[e]specially since any finding of third-party payor
liability for negligence would not place any fiscal or administrative burden upon an employee
benefit plan itself, there is no reason to extend ERISA preemption to this type of action.”).
368
See supra note 275 and accompanying text (explaining the congressional intent of
ERISA).
369

Ingersoll-Rand Co. at 137-38. See supra note 267 and accompanying text (describing
the use of congressional intent).
370

Pegram at 232.
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B. Physician Financial Incentive Agreements Can Rise To A Breach
Based on the fiduciary relationship between the HMO and its membership, a
breach of this relationship occurs through the use of direct physician financial
incentives. Financial incentives have been found to rise to the level of a breach of
fiduciary duty.371 The bonus distribution allocated to Carle’s physician/owners fits
into the category of a physician financial incentive.
1. Carle’s Bonus Distribution
The claim in Herdrich brings to light Carle’s provision for a “year end
distribution” to the plan’s physicians.372 Herdrich argued this particular incentive
device of annually paying physician owners the profits resulting from their own
decisions rationing care is a breach of the fiduciary relationship.373 This type of
distribution could be defined as a bonus incentive.374 Bonus incentives are often
used to control the use of ancillary services, for example an ultrasound exam.375
Very often, ancillary services are paid out of a separate “pot” of funds and whatever
funds are not used at the end of the year from procedures not performed is in turn
returned to the physicians.376 Therefore, it could have been possible that Carle’s
“year-end distribution” included funds not utilized on diagnostic procedures, like
ultrasound exams. If true, this bonus agreement could have given Dr. Pegram
incentive not to promptly order the ultrasound exam for Ms. Herdrich.377
In addition, ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciaries from dealing with the assets of
the plan in its own interests or in its own account based on the idea that a fiduciary
must perform his duties solely in the interest of the plan participants.378 A very
strong argument can be made that Dr. Pegram had her own financial interests in
371
Herdrich at 373 (“[i]ncentives can rise to the level of a breach where, as pleaded here,
the fiduciary trust between plan participants and plan fiduciaries no longer exists (i.e. where
physicians delay providing necessary treatment to, or withhold administering proper care to,
plan beneficiaries for the sole purpose of increasing their bonuses)”). See also, Shea v.
Esensten, 107 F.3d 625, 629 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding a breach of fiduciary duty for not
disclosing physician financial incentive agreements). But see, Ehlmann v. Kaiser Found.
Health Plan of Texas, 198 F.3d 552, 555 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that ERISA does not impose
a fiduciary duty on HMOs to disclose physician compensations and reimbursement schemes to
plan members).
372
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (discussing Carle’s “year-end
distribution” to the plan’s physicians).
373

Id.

374

See discussion supra Part III.A.3.c.3 (describing physician bonus agreement and
incentives used by HMOs to control costs).
375

See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (explaining that ancillary services are
very often a target for bonus withholds and distributions).
376
See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (explaining how ancillary services are
often paid out a separate set of finds).
377

See supra note 215 and accompanying text (stating that physicians recognize that they
can increase the amount of their compensation if they reduce the use of ancillary services).
378

Herdrich at 371 (citing 29 U.S.C. §1104(a)(1)).
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mind when she prevented Ms. Herdrich from having the ultrasound procedure at a
nearby hospital instead of at the “plan’ hospital which was over fifty miles away. Dr.
Pegram was likely aware that the fewer procedures enacted on clients, the larger her
year end bonus would be.379
Carle’s bonus agreement is not the only incentive at play here. The tactic of
panel selection is also involved.380 Panel selection involves the HMO choosing a
select number of sites in which services may be conducted for their members. The
site where Herdrich had to wait eight days to receive treatment was a panel
selection.381 The use of panel sites is often encouraged through the use of financial
incentives placed on the physicians. Their salary, bonuses, or continuance of an
HMO physician may be completely or partially decided based on the use of these
pre-selected sites.382
2. The Effect of Incentive Arrangements on Patient Care: Creating
a System of Dual Loyalties
Depending on the exact financial arrangement, the physician may have to choose
between her own income and what is needed for the patient’s well-being.383 This
choice creates a system of dual loyalties. Financial incentives create a dual-loyalty
that forces physicians to choose between the needs of their patients and physicians’
own financial well-being. HMOs, like Carle, place physicians in this dilemma. A
strong argument can be made that current financial incentives placed on physicians
like Dr. Pegram, advance this dilemma and encourage a decision based on financial
factors.
a. “ERISA Tolerates Some Conflict of Interest”
It is true that ERISA allows fiduciaries to adopt dual loyalties.384 However,
tolerance of dual loyalties does not extend to cases like Herdrich.385 The point is not
379

See supra note 215 and accompanying text (stating that physicians recognize that they
can increase the amount of their compensation if they reduce the use of ancillary services).
380

See discussion supra Part III.A.3.b (discussing the panel selection system and how it is
a tool for cost-containment).
381
See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (explaining that the hospital where Dr.
Pegram wanted Ms. Herdrich to have the ultrasound procedure conducted was a Carle
facility).
382

See supra notes 184-86 and accompanying text (discussing how the panel selection
system creates a financial incentive to follow HMO policy in order to remain a part of the
physician panel).
383

See Greely, supra note 180, at 71-72.

384

Herdrich at 373 (“[w]e do not disagree with this contention, for it is well established
that dual loyalties are tolerated under ERISA.”).
385

Id.
Our point is not that a fiduciary may not have dual loyalties; it is that the tolerance of
dual loyalties does not extend to the situation like the case before us where a fiduciary
jettisons his responsibility to the physical well-being of beneficiaries in favor of
“loyalty” to his own financial interests). . . . Tolerance, in other words, has its limits.

Id.
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that there may be dual loyalties; it is that they should not extend to a situation like
this in which the fiduciary relinquishes his responsibility in order to improve his own
financial standing.386
A doctor that must provide for his own family would be interested in a relatively
substantial bonus for himself.387 The complaint in Herdrich stated that the Carle
doctors stood to benefit financially when they were able to limit the types of
treatments and referrals.388 An argument can be made that Carle placed financial
pressures on its physicians, like Dr. Pegram, through the use of financial incentives
for offering less patient care.389 These dual loyalties arguably caused the Carle
doctors to be faced with an incentive to limit care as to guarantee more of a bonus.390
This financial pressure may have caused Dr. Pegram to make a decision based on her
own financial well-being, possibly to the detriment of Ms. Herdrich.
In addition, the Carle physicians were “intimately involved” with the financial
well-being of the enterprise because the yearly bonus paid to them was controlled by
their limited utilization of treatments and referrals to other physicians.391 This bonus
arrangement has a direct link to the physician’s annual salary. The situation in
Herdrich is much different than the cases in which the ERISA’s acceptance of dual
loyalties is founded. Case law on dual loyalties involves situations in which the dual
loyalties did not have a direct link to the fiduciary’s annual salary.392 Thus, a
distinction can be made between the fiduciary situation by which ERISA is accepting
of dual loyalties and the Herdrich case. The Herdrich case is a more extreme
example of dual loyalties due to the direct link between the action that creates the
dual loyalty and the direct effect the dual loyalty has on the fiduciary. In the end, this

386

Herdrich at 373.

387

Id. at 379 (explaining that “[a] doctor who is responsible for the real life financial
demands of providing for his or her family–sending four children to school (whether it be
college, high school or primary school), making house payments, covering office overhead,
and paying malpractice insurance, might very well ‘flinch’ at the prospect of obtaining a
relatively substantial bonus for himself or herself.”).
388
See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (describing Herdrich’s allegations against
Carle).
389

See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (discussing how financial incentives are
aimed at discouraging the ordering of an “extra” medical procedures).
390
See discussion supra Part III.A.3.c.3 (describing physician bonus agreement and
incentives used by HMOs to control costs).
391

Herdrich at 379.

392

Id. (“the officers in Chalmers who made the decision to distribute severance benefits
were not the owners of the corporation”). In addition, the court added that “nothing in the
facts of Chalmers leads us to infer that Quaker officers were shareholders, or even had an
interest in the financial well-being of the company.” Id. (comparing the holding in Chalmers,
61 F.3d at 1344, that an automatic bias did not exist against the distribution of severance
benefits, despite the fact that the members of the committee that distributes the severance
benefits were officers of the corporation). The dissent in the Herdrich appellate decision
argues that this case assists in establishing that ERISA does allow dual-loyalties of a fiduciary.
Herdrich at 381 (“dual loyalties are not per se unlawful under ERISA”). See also supra note
84 and accompanying text (quoting Chalmers at ___).
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dual loyalty makes it very difficult for a physician to choose to administer important,
yet borderline necessary treatment, at the expense of their own financial well being.
b. A Lack of Accurate Data
Much literature has been created over the past few decades seeking to find the
differences in quality of care between the “fee-for-service” and HMO systems.393
Overall, the literature seems to show that HMOs do not provide better, or worse
care.394 However, it is very important to note that this conclusion is largely drawn
from studies completed in the 1970s and 1980s, which were eras that included a
different HMO system than today.395 Today’s managed care environment includes
the immense use of cost-containment tactics. “We cannot safely extrapolate from the
response of physicians in the systems studied in those eras to the responses of
physicians in today’s many different systems.”396
Commentators have, however, identified a number of more detailed factors that
are related to the degree of influence that direct financial incentives have on
physician decision-making.397 The trial court should have reviewed three of these
factors in order to better understand Dr. Pegram’s situation in making the treatment
decisions that she made. Those factors are: (1) the extent of the physician’s risk, (2)
the number of physician’s sharing that risk, and (3) the portion of the physician’s
income derived from the HMO.398
The Court argued that if recovery were based on incentive programs
implemented by HMOs alone, the HMO would be turned into a guarantor of
recovery.399 Utilizing a factor test much like the one described above would not
guarantee liability in every situation presented. The test could be used in order to

393
See Greely, supra note 180, at 71 (“a voluminous literature has built up over the past
few decades seeking to find differences in the quality of care between fee-for-service and
HMO systems.”).
394

Id.

395

See supra notes 112-21 and accompanying text (describing the change in health care
from the traditional “fee-for-service” system to modern managed care systems).
396
Greely, supra note 180, at 71. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (describing modern
managed care cost-containment techniques). See also discussion supra Part III.A.3.d
(explaining data regarding the use of direct financial incentives by HMOs).
397

See Greely, supra note 180, at 72.

398

Id. The complete list of factors is as follows: (1) the extent of the physician’s risk; (2)
the existence and term of stop-loss insurance; (3) the distribution of risk to individual doctors
or groups; (4) the number of physicians sharing the risk; (5) the number of patients in a
physician’s patient panel; (6) the duration of the risk assessment period; (7) the generosity of
the physician’s compensation for direct services; (8) the portion of the physician’s income
derived from the HMO; and, (9) the generosity of service utilization budgets. Id. (citing the
GAO report found at, HEALTH, EDUC. & HUMAN SERV. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFFICE,
MEDICAID MANAGED CARE: MORE COMPETITION AND OVERSIGHT WOULD IMPROVE
CALIFORNIA’S EXPANSION PLAN (1995).
399
Pegram at 234-35 (“[I]t would be so easy to allege, and to find, an economic influence
when sparing care did not lead to a well patient, that any such standard in practice would allow
a factfinder to convert an HMO into a guarantor of recovery.”).
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conduct a fair analysis of the physician’s relation to the HMO’s financial incentives.
Perhaps a review of the factors introduced would determine that Dr. Pegram did
make her decision to prolong the ultrasound analysis based on strict medicaljudgment. The problem is that the Herdrich record is void of any analysis of this
sort. The Court erred in not allowing the case to be remanded to the trial court in
order to investigate the payment scheme utilized by Carle on Dr. Pegram. Only
broad generalizations were made by the Court in citing a “flood gate” theory in not
allowing the case to be reviewed again by the trial court.400
c. The Physician Response and Patient Trust
Additional evidence can be found by looking at how physicians feel about HMO
cost-control arrangements. Many physicians, with financial incentives placed on
them by health plans, believe undivided loyalty to their patients has diminished in
the profession during the past ten years.401 Commentators argue that the economic
exigencies of the time require adjustment of the moral standard of undivided
loyalty.402 It has been demonstrated that physicians with financial incentives based
on productivity are less satisfied with their practices and are more “ethically
troubled” than their colleagues who are not in the same environment.403 “Physicians
imbued with a sense of professional identity that has stressed altruism and loyalty to
patients may experience the appeal to financial self-interests as a means of
controlling costs, as a direct threat to their self-understanding as professionals.”404 It
is not difficult to discern from the above data that Dr. Pegram may have been
experiencing many of the expressed feelings in deciding a treatment course for Ms.
Herdrich. What role the financial incentives played with Dr. Pegram is still
unknown.
Trust is at the center of the physician-patient relationship.405 Patient reports
regarding their trust in their physician are tightly correlated with the perceptions of
physicians.406 The “dual agency” inherent in these financial arrangements may feed

400
Id. at 237 (“[W]hat would be gained by opening the federal courthouse doors for a
fiduciary malpractice claim, save for possibly random fortuities such as more favorable
scheduling, or the ancillary opportunity to seek attorney’s fees.”).
401
See Sulmasy, supra note 6, at 7 (explaining that “in a multivariate regression analysis,
physicians who reported financial incentives to limit tests, treatments, and referrals were
significantly and independently more likely to find such financial incentives morally troubling,
to believe that commitment to the ethic of undivided loyalty to patients has eroded, and to
report diminished patient trust in them.”). See also supra note 11 (discussing the parameters
in which the survey and analysis was conducted).
402

See Sulmasy, supra note 6, at 2.

403

Id. at 7.

404

Id.

405

Id. at 9. See also E. Haavi Morreim, Cost Containment and the Standard of Medical
Care, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1719, 1727 (1987) (“The patient must be able to repose confidence in
his physician, believing that the latter will be not only professionally competent but also
devoted to his interests.”).
406

See Sulmasy, supra note 6, at 9.
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patient skeptics about their physician’s loyalty to them.407 A trusting relationship is
essential to good health care.408 “To permit physicians routinely to balance their
patients’ interests against others economic welfare could devastate this fiduciary
relationship.”409 The patient must believe that the physician will not only be
professionally competent but also devoted to his interests.410
d. The Role of the Market Forces Argument
The dissent in the Seventh Circuit opinion argued that “market forces” help
reduce the risk that a fiduciary’s conflict of interest will work to the detriment of the
plan and the plan beneficiaries.411 The dissent states, without any citation, that “plan
sponsors are likely to take their business elsewhere if they perceive that incentives
are working to the detriment of beneficiaries or to the plan itself, and thus market
forces go a long way towards ensuring that incentives do not rise to a dangerous or
undesirable levels.”412
Herdrich is a clear example of why the market forces argument does not protect
HMO members against financial incentives raising to dangerous levels. “The
‘market forces’ the dissent refers to hardly seem to have produced a positive result in
this case. . . .”413 Due to the financial incentives placed on Dr. Pegram, which
resulted in a delay in diagnosis, Ms. Herdrich suffered a life threatening illness.414
This illness necessitated a longer hospital stay and a more serious surgery, which
came at a greater cost to both Ms. Herdrich and Carle.415
In addition, the dissent also raises an “efficiency argument” that financial
incentives may bring about a more effective use of HMO assets.416 The flaw in this
argument is clearly articulated by the Seventh Circuit: “Indeed, the eight-day delay
407
Id. (explaining that while their data can not establish a clear cause-and-effect
relationship between financial incentives and diminished patient trust, the date does add fuel to
the argument that there is a connection).
408

See Morreim, supra note 402, at 1727 (explaining that unless patients believe that their
physician is acting in their own best interests, it would be difficult for a patient to have a
trusting relationship that is essential in the delivery of good health care).
409

Id.

410

Id.

411

See Herdrich at 381. See discussion supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the dissent in the
Seventh Circuit decision). See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text (describing the
“market forces” argument in greater detail).
412

Herdrich at 374.

413

Id.

414

See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (describing the delay of the ultrasound
procedure as the cause of Ms. Herdrich’s peritonitis).
415
Herdrich at 374 (explaining that “[i]n an effort to defray the increased costs associated
with the surgery required to drain and cleanse Herdrich’s ruptured appendix, Carle insisted
that she have the procedure performed at its own Urbana facility, necessitating that Herdrich
travel more than fifty miles from her neighborhood hospital in Bloomington, Illinois.”).
416

See supra note 86, and accompanying text (describing the dissent’s “efficiency
argument.”).
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in medical care, and the onset of peritonitis Herdrich incurred as a result of such
delay in diagnosis, subjected her to a life-threatening illness, a longer period of
hospitalization and treatment, more extensive, invasive, and dangerous surgery,
increased hospital costs, and a greater ingestion of prescription drugs.”417 This is not
a good example of the efficient use of medical resources. Overall, “[m]arket forces
are insufficient to cure the deleterious affects of managed care on the health care
industry.”418
The determination that Carle breached their fiduciary duty to Ms. Herdrich is
premised on two facts. First, ERISA expressly prohibits fiduciaries from dealing in
the assets of the plan. A strong argument can be made that the bonus agreement that
Carle placed on Dr. Pegram caused her to order fewer procedures for her patients
knowing that this action would increase her individual bonus at the end of the year.
The bonus was directly tied to ordering less care.
Secondly, it can be argued that ERISA would not tolerate a dual loyalties
situation in the HMO setting. The cases in which the acceptance of dual loyalties in
the fiduciary setting are not analogous to the Herdrich case. The main defining
factor being a direct link between the fiduciaries’ annual salary and the medical
decisions being made for the fiduciary.
In addition, data suggests that patient trust in their physicians is decreasing. This
factor, along with the first two aforementioned clearly establish a breach in the
fiduciary relationship between Carle and Ms. Herdrich.
C. Solutions
Whether we like it or not, physician financial incentives are a crucial part of our
modern health care economy and are here to stay. In order to prevent situations like
Ms. Herdrich’s from occurring, while still continuing to keep health care costs at a
manageable level, a delicate balance must be met. Three main things must occur in
order for this balance to be met: (1) cases like Herdrich v. Pegram must be remanded
for continued fact-finding regarding the details of the financial motives involved, (2)
ERISA must be amended in order to acknowledge a fiduciary relationship between
HMO members and the HMO itself, and (3) physician financial arrangements must
be disclosed to HMO patient members.
1. Remand Herdrich v. Pegram
Although the amount of hard data available regarding the true impact of
physician incentive programs and patient care is sparse, the courts should scrutinize
the facts of each incentive case in order to collect information regarding the true
impact of these programs.419 Broad statements can easily be made about the different
types of financial incentive agreements utilized by HMOs. However, incentive
agreements vary greatly from HMO-to-HMO based on several factors, including the

417

Herdrich at 378.

418

Id. at 374-75.

419

See discussion supra Part IV.B.1.b (discussing the lack of accurate data regarding the
effect financial incentives have on physician care). See supra notes 224-31 and accompanying
text (discussing the extent of the use of financial incentives by HMOs).
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type of HMO and physician reimbursement arrangements.420 Factors have been
created that set up a framework for reviewing the individual physician’s
arrangement.421 Courts should be encouraged to use this list and to eventually create
their own. Case law is sparse in this area and needs to be established.422
There are many facts that will continue to remain unknown about Dr. Pegram’s
motives in delaying the ultrasound procedure. We will never know the details on
Carle’s “year-end” distribution to know if it did play a factor in the delay of the
ultrasound. In addition, it will remain unknown the role that the reimbursement
system utilized by Carle played in Dr. Pegram’s decision-making. Possibly, Dr.
Pegram felt pressure to refer patients only to Carle providers for fear that she would
be de-selected from Carle’s physician panel.423 The Court should have remanded the
Herdrich case for these reasons. This case presented the Court with an opportunity
to create much needed case law dealing with the impact of these incentive programs
and it failed to take advantage of that opportunity.
The Court fears that a decision finding a breach of fiduciary relation based on
incentive arrangements would cause a type of “instant liability” for HMOs.424 This is
simply not true. By establishing factors to review each physician incentive
arrangement involved, a case-by-case analysis could be conducted that will not result
in per se liability for the HMO. The longer that the issue of physician incentive
agreements is accepted by the court, the more complex and confusing the situation
will become. Moreover, HMOs will continue to escape liability.425 It is time that the
Court stops hiding behind definitional roadblocks and creates some much needed
precedent.
2. Amending ERISA
The Herdrich decision, and many others before it, was burdened with the hurdles
of ERISA. It was not the intent of the drafters of ERISA to put roadblocks between

420

See discussion supra Part III.A.2.a-c (discussing the types of HMO’s and they methods
in which they are organized). See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (explaining the
different levels of liability associated with each HMO type).
421

See supra note 395 and accompanying text (describing the factor test established by the
GAO for determining the strength that the individual’s financial incentives have on their
patient care decision making).
422
See supra notes 232-33 and accompanying text (indicating that there are currently very
few published opinions regarding the use of physician financial incentive programs by
HMOs).
423
See discussion supra Part III.A.3. b (discussing panel selection). See supra notes 37779 and accompanying text (discussing how Dr. Pegram may have feared being de-selected
from Carle’s physician panel).
424

See supra notes 396-97 and accompanying text (arguing that if a factor type analysis
was utilized by the courts, HMOs would not become instant “guarantors of recovery” based
solely on its use of financial incentive programs).
425

See supra notes 298-305 and accompanying text (describing the “roadblocks” that
ERISA places in front of a patient attempting to bring a claim against their HMO).

2001-02]

THE SERPENT IN THE GARDEN OF EDEN

337

patients and the care that they need.426 A quick look at the early stages of ERISA
reveals this fact. ERISA was created to make sure that persons had access to the care
they needed.427 Too many courts have used ERISA as a method of avoiding review
and eventual decisions of these issues. ERISA has simply turned into a tool used by
health care organizations to avoid liability. This could not have been what the
drafters intended.428
There are two ways ERISA could be amended: (1) ERISA should be amended to
acknowledge a fiduciary relationship between the HMO and HMO patient; and (2)
ERISA should be amended to expand the “insurance savings clause” to include
common-law tort and contract claims.
a. Acknowledgement of a Fiduciary Relationship
Herdrich is a fine example of a clear fiduciary relationship that is established
between an HMO and a member through the utilization programs that are utilized by
health care plans.429 Utilization review methods are an accepted method of modern
HMO practice and they should be accepted as creating a fiduciary relationship.430
The argument could continue forever on who really makes the decisions: The
physician or the HMO.431 However, while we are busy arguing this fact, patients are
left without a remedy through ERISA against their HMO for mistakes made in the
utilization review process.
In the beginning, one of the primary goals of ERISA was to create uniformity in
regulation of these types of plans.432 By amending ERISA’s preemption provision to
acknowledge a fiduciary relationship between the HMO and the member, uniformity
can be achieved in hearing these claims. Claims will finally be argued by looking at
the exact incentive schemes of the physician involved.
By declaring that a fiduciary duty exists under ERISA between the HMO and the
patient, we are guaranteeing that HMO members will have a cause of action in order
to enforce their rights to full and complete medical treatment no matter what the
cost- containment tactic utilized by the managed care plan is.

426
See supra note 367 and accompanying text (explaining what types of people the ERISA
statute was designed to protect).
427

Id. (explaining that ERISA was first established to protect retirees from mismanagement
by employers of their retirement benefits which is analogous to protection of the health
benefits of the modern day HMO member).
428
See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text (explaining the congressional intent
behind the ERISA statute).
429

See discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that a fiduciary duty does exist between
Carle and Ms. Herdrich partly through Carle’s usage of physician incentive programs like
utilization review).
430
See supra note 327 and accompanying text (stating that utilization review is used by
almost every HMO in some form or another).
431

See discussion supra Part IV.1.c (discussion the “mixed eligibility decision” debate).

432

See supra note 256 and accompanying text (stating the purpose of the ERISA statute to
create a comprehensive, uniform regulatory system for self-funded employee benefit plans).
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b. Expansion of the “Savings Clause”
According to current case law, common-law tort and contract claims do not fall
under the “savings clause” and are preempted by ERISA.433 Therefore, patients who
are part of an ERISA qualified plan are blocked from bringing tort and contract
claims.434 The ERISA preemption creates a major roadblock to patient recovery in
these types of situations.435 The patient’s only option is to attempt to prove a breach
by utilizing the ERISA standards, which did not work very well for Ms. Herdrich.
By expanding the “savings clause” to include these common law claims, an
additional avenue would be available for patient recovery when harm has been done.
By amending the “savings clause,” those patients, who are a part of an ERISA
qualified plan and those who are not, would be placed on a level playing field. The
protection of patient interests is far from adequate under the current ERISA statute
and legislative action should be taken to correct this situation.
3. Full Disclosure of Incentive Agreements
HMOs should be required to disclose the financial incentives under which their
physicians work. Courts have already endorsed disclosure.436 “From the patients’
point of view, a financial incentive scheme put into place to influence a treating
doctor’s referral practices when the patient needs specialized care is certainly a
material piece of information.”437 Patients may make different decisions for their
course of treatment if they are aware of the incentive schemes in which their
physicians are involved.438
Information that is presented regarding incentive agreements at the time a
member enrolls can help the patient plan their coverage more effectively, including
choice of health plan and choice of coverage.439 This information should come from
the HMO as a part of an integrated communications strategy along with a core
obligation of the health plan to provide members with simple descriptions of
financial incentives, written in plain language, and distributed in connection with
information on physician selection and denial.440 If all this information is distributed
together, members will be able to make informed health care choices and they will

433
See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text (citing the holding in Pilot Life that
common law claims for tort and contract do not fall under the “savings clause” of ERISA).
See discussion supra Part III.B.3 (discussing the “savings clause” of ERISA).
434

Id.

435

See supra notes 298-99 and accompanying text (describing the “roadblock” that ERISA
pre-emption causes for patients who attempt bring liability claims against their HMO).
436
See supra note 368 and accompanying text (describing the Shea case in which the court
found a breach of fiduciary duty for not disclosing physician financial incentive agreements).
437

See Shea at 628.

438

Id. at 627 (explaining that according to Mr. Shea’s widow, if her husband would have
known about his doctor’s incentive agreement, he would have disregarded the doctor's advice
and sought a second opinion at his own expense).
439

See Miller, supra note 7, at 5.

440

Id. at 9.
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be empowered to exercise their rights as a member of the HMO once they are
enrolled.441
“Disclosure therefore dovetails with a national trend toward creating new legal
rights for managed care members, including the right to change primary care
physicians, to examine utilization review criteria, and to appeal coverage decisions to
an entity independent of the health plan.”442 In order to benefit from these
entitlements, members must understand the basis of managed care and it is the
HMO’s responsibility to make sure that they receive the information.443 Legal
mandates for health plan disclosure are already on the rise. Since 1995, nearly
twenty states have required insurance companies and HMOs to explain physician
compensation methods to enrollees.444
V. CONCLUSION
In the past, the incentive for physicians was to provide more care, not less.445 In
the modern, managed care environment, the incentive has been reversed.446 HMOs
were created in order to apply much-needed cost-containment programs to the health
insurance industry.447 HMOs and their utilization review systems have succeeded in
controlling health care costs.448 However, liability must be accepted by HMOs for
use of their cost-containment methods like physician financial incentive programs.
These programs establish a fiduciary duty between the HMO and patient that should
no longer be ignored.449
Future cases similar to Herdrich v. Pegram will provide the opportunity for the
legal system to take a stand on HMO liability. In this case, the Court missed the
opportunity. Financial incentive programs placed on physicians cause them to be
441

Id. at 7.

442

Id.

443

Id. at 5, 7 (arguing that incentive programs should be discussed with the patient by the
HMO and not the physician due to the possible negative impact the information may have on
the patient’s view of the physician and the medical profession as a whole). However, trust of
physicians involved in an HMO may already be diminished and candor to the patient
regarding the existence of incentive programs may reinforce trust for some patients. And See,
Miller, supra note 7, at 57.
444

Id. at 6 (explaining that “the health plan is permitted to include, in a separate section, an
explanation or justification for these incentives or penalties.”).
445

See supra note 116 and accompanying text (explaining the physician’s desire to provide
more patient care, not less).
446
See supra note 136 and accompanying text (explaining how the modern HMO system
encourages a physician to provide less care, not more).
447

See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (explaining why health care costs have
skyrocketed, thus causing the need for HMOs).
448

See discussion supra Part III.A.3.a (discussing utilization review as a cost-containment
program).
449
See discussion supra Part IV.A.1 (arguing that a fiduciary duty does exist between
Carle and Ms. Herdrich partly through Carle’s usage of physician incentive programs like
utilization review).
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“tempted” to choose between their own financial well-being and the best course of
treatment for their patients.450 Movement should be made towards striking a balance
between all the systems at play causing tension between the patient, physician, and
HMO. This balance can be made through disclosure of physician incentive programs
and the amendment of ERISA.451 HMOs serve both an important and effective role
in controlling skyrocketing health care costs, but along with this role comes the need
to take responsibility for their decisions.

450

See supra note 380 (explaining the dual-loyalties situation).

451

See discussion supra Part IV.C.3 (arguing mandatory disclosure to HMO members by
the HMO of any financial incentive agreements that they may have with their physicians).

